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THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

BETWEEN

CROMWELL

AND

CHARLES X. GUSTAVUS OF SWEDEN

INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY, SUBMITTED TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL
FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG.

BY

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PREFACE.

Civil wars are not favorable to the preservation of letters and papers of historical value, since no one is willing to preserve material which may, on the failure of his cause, compromise him in the eyes of his victorious enemies. No one is willing to preserve evidence which may subsequently convict him of treason. "Burn this letter after the perusal of it," wrote Col. Gilbert Talbot to the Marquis of Ormond in 1655, "'tis not good to have papers, fearing some misfortune." In the case of the English Puritan Revolution, we know that some of its prominent men destroyed their papers, for they have told us so. We infer from the general scantiness of these records that many others did the same.

There is another reason why our records for the Interregnum are so meagre. Charles I. had the commendable practice on the death of a secretary of state of seizing all his papers, which are now kept in the Public Record Office. But Cromwell paid no attention to such matters. Possession of a public document during his time was synonymous with ownership; consequently much the greater part of them are not to be found in the public archives, but in private collections. These have, to be sure, in large measure, come into the possession of the Bodleian Library and of the British Museum, and are therefore accessible, but the period of migration which they went through before finding their final depository was not favorable to their preservation, and they still remain not only fragmentary but scattered to an exasperating degree.¹

The great mine of information for the diplomatic history of the Interregnum is the collection of dispatches known as the Thurloe Papers, which, after a career of adventure, finally came into the possession of the Bodleian Library. The greater part of them were published in 1742 by Thomas Birch in seven folio volumes. There is nothing

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¹The Reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission give information concerning such collections as are still in private possession.

material among the unpublished dispatches. Reference to the collection has been facilitated somewhat by Setterwall's "Förteckning öfver Acta Svecia in 'A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe,'" *Historisk Tidskrift* (Stockholm), 1890. The dispatches which relate to Meadowe's and Jephson's embassies should be supplemented by the letters recently found in New Zealand by Professor Edward Jenks and published in the *English Historical Review*, vii., 720-742.

The *Carte MSS.* at the Bodleian contain some important letters. I examined the *Clarendon State Papers* with care, but hardly felt repaid for my labor. Some of the *Carte Papers* have been published under the title "A Collection of Original Letters and Papers Concerning the Affairs of England, 1641-1660, by T. C. [Thomas Carte], 2 vols., London, 1739." Three large folio volumes of the *Clarendon Papers* were published at Oxford in 1767. The *Tanner collection* contains some negotiations between England and the countries about the Baltic, but they refer chiefly to the period of the Commonwealth. The greater part of the existing diplomatic documents of the *Interregnum* are contained in these collections in the Bodleian.

The college libraries at Oxford have nothing of consequence touching our subject.¹ There is, however, among the *Williamson MSS.* belonging to Queen's College a manuscript catalogue² which contains brief notes of negotiations between England and foreign states from about the year 1540 to 1662, with references to other volumes where they are more fully detailed. One of these volumes, designated by the mark \$\$\$, presumably a manuscript volume belonging to Williamson's own library, has much material bearing upon English relations with Sweden and Denmark during Cromwell's time, and referring especially to matters of trade. It would seem to be valuable, but I have not been able to find any further trace of it.

There is nothing at the *Public Record Office*³ worthy of mention except Bliss' Transcripts from the *Swedish Archives*, containing a copy of Bonde's Diary, and Baschet's Transcripts of *Bordeaux's* correspondence with *Mazarin* and *Brienne*. The latter, however, is much less in-

¹ Coxe, *Catalogus Codicium MSS. qui in Collegiis Aulicisne Oxoniensibus hodie adservantur*, 2 vols.

² Queen's College MSS., xxxix. Williamson was secretary of state from 1674 to 1678.

³ R. S. Scargill-Bird, *Guide to the Principal Classes of Documents preserved in the Public Record Office*. Detailed information is given in the various Reports of the Deputy Keeper of Public Records.

structive than one might be led to expect from the similarity of English and French policies toward Sweden. There were various causes for mutual suspicion, and the relations of the two countries were by no means so cordial as they appeared outwardly. The domestic papers for this period have been calendared by Mrs. Green, and this Calendar has in turn been calendared, so far as Sweden is concerned, by Setterwall in *Historisk Tidskrift*, 1889. Macray's Report on the Libraries of Sweden and the Archives and Libraries of Denmark in the Reports of the Deputy Keeper of Public Records (Reports xliii., xlv., xlvi., and xlvii.) are valuable for reference.

The dispatches of the Swedish ambassadors in England have not been available to me. Those of Nieupoort, the Dutch ambassador, are contained in De Witt's *Brieven*, vol. iii. The relations between England, Sweden, and the Netherlands were so inextricably interwoven that the letters of Nieupoort are often as valuable as the dispatches of the Swedish ambassadors themselves. They appear to have been but little used in this connection. The correspondence of Schlezer, the ambassador from Brandenburg, published by Erdmannsdörffer in volume vii. of *Urkunden und Actenstücke*, should not be neglected.

Thurloe has given us two accounts of the Protector's policy in the North. One was furnished the House of Commons, February 18, 1659, in a speech reported by Burton. The other, an account of the Protector's foreign relations as a whole, was furnished the ministry of the Restoration in 1660, of which a manuscript copy is among the Stowe MSS. in the British Museum. The second account has been used by the author of the anonymous tract "Concerning the Forraigne Affaires in the Protector's Time," printed in volume vi. of Lord Somer's *Tracts*, but without mentioning his source. The changes in the printed tract are in fact mere changes in arrangement and style. A copy of the latter part of the manuscript, which deals with affairs in the North, was made by Professor Grimur Thorkelin, the celebrated editor of the first edition of *Beowulf*, for the Royal Library of Copenhagen.¹

These accounts by Thurloe may be supplemented by a similar one

¹It is contained in the *new* (not *old*, as Macray's Report gives it) collection of MSS., 649c, in folio. It was through information kindly furnished by the Rev. Mr. Macray and Justitsr. Dr. Chr. Bruun, Librarian of the Royal Library at Copenhagen, that I was able to trace the Stowe manuscript. It is, however, not the original, but an undated copy, with many errors in copying. The part which deals with affairs in the North is printed as Appendix (A) to this work.

by Meadowe, who from his experience as ambassador in the North is entitled to speak with some authority. It is entitled "A Narrative of the Principal Actions occurring in the Wars between Sueden and Denmark, before and after the Roschild Treaty, * * * together with a View of the Suedish and other Affairs, as they stood in Germany in the year 1675, with relation to England." The first part was in manuscript for some years before it was printed in 1677. A copy of the manuscript having, as I infer, come into the hands of Sir Roger Manley, he did not hesitate to incorporate it into his "History of the late Warres in Denmark," published in 1670. The two accounts run parallel for pages with only verbal changes. Manley was a soldier in these wars and could not very well have had so intimate a knowledge of diplomatic events. In Wieselgren's *Dela Gardiska Archivet*, xii., p. 145, we are informed of another work by Meadowe, "The Interest of the English in the Sound as Affaires now stand, London, 1660," but I have not been able to find a copy of it.

Among historical works which deal with this subject, Pufendorff's *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo Suecice Rege gestis* is the only one which covers the whole ground. Apparently it is based almost entirely upon the dispatches of the Swedish ambassadors, and is invaluable to those to whom the original correspondence is not available. It has been entirely superseded, however, for part of the period by Kalling's "Riksrådet Frih. C. Bondes ambassad till England, 1655, akad. afh., Upsala, 1851." In this account the author has not attempted to make a critical estimate of the value of his sources, but has merely reduced Bonde's dispatches to narrative form. Indeed, he tells us that in all important passages he has used Bonde's own words. His narrative is nevertheless of great value. It is more detailed than Pufendorff's and pays more attention to exact chronology than Pufendorff seems to have thought necessary. It ends abruptly with November 25, 1655. The promised second part seems never to have appeared.

In recent historical literature there is little to mention.¹ The state of English records is not such as to tempt investigators to the subject. Gardiner's History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate has not yet reached this point. The Danish work of *Fridericia, Danmarks*

¹ "Eine eingehende actenmässige Darstellung derselben (d. h., der englisch-schwedischen Beziehungen zur Zeit Cromwells) steht noch aus." Pribram in *Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte*, lxx., 100, Anm.

ydre politiske historie, has not been continued beyond 1645. The Swedish published sources have a provoking way of stopping just before our period begins. Rydberg's *Sveriges Traktater med frammande magter*, has only reached (in 1891) the year 1630. Carlson's *Sveriges historia under Konungarne af Pfälziska Huset* (German translation by Petersen) gives a detailed account of Swedish affairs during this period. Erdmannsdörffer's *Deutsche Geschichte*, vol. i., p. 211, *seq.*, gives a more summary account, and devotes some pages to Cromwell's plan of getting a foothold in Northern Germany (vol. i., 284, *seq.*) Other sources will be indicated as occasion offers.

It will be noticed how few references are made to the records of Parliament, to newspapers, or to contemporary pamphlets. Foreign affairs were controlled entirely by the Protector and his Council, and they kept their secrets so well¹ that little is to be learned from other than official sources. Even if information did occasionally leak out, the gazettes would of course not have been allowed to publish it. A convenient collection of newspaper cuttings has been published by Stace under the title "Cromwelliana."

I have taken the liberty of modernizing the spelling in all the extracts quoted. The spelling of the 17th century was notably careless, and I see no advantage to be derived from retaining it.

I cannot neglect this opportunity to acknowledge the kindness and never-failing patience of Dr. Neubauer of the Bodleian Library, who rendered me the greatest assistance in every difficulty which arose in connection with the manuscripts in Oxford.

GUERNSEY JONES.

BRITISH MUSEUM, April 15, 1896.

¹ *Urk. u. Actenst.*, vii., 742, Anm.

INTRODUCTION.

RELATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND SWEDEN BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE NORTHERN WAR.¹

The diplomatic relations between England and Sweden before the English Puritan Revolution were not so close nor so fruitful as the circumstances of the time would seem to have rendered inevitable. It was a period of religious wars, yet no alliance was formed between these two pillars of the Protestant faith.

The fault of this must be laid at the door of the first two Stuarts, but it was not, as has been often said, the fault of their secret Catholic sympathies, but of their blundering personal incompetence. Their foreign policies were based upon dreams of religious toleration and mediation, upon consideration of supposed personal honor, upon the interests of blood relations, upon the influence of incompetent favorites, upon everything, it would seem, except the real points at issue.

James' attempt to secure a position in Europe by means of which he could mediate between the hostile creeds and soften their intolerance was indeed a noble one, but it required a higher order of ability for its execution than he could tolerate in his councils. The humiliating outcome of the Spanish marriage project in 1623 marked the final failnre of this policy. Just at this time, as if by happy chance, Gustavus Adolphus ascended the throne of Sweden, prepared to take advantage of the change in English councils. He proposed a plan for a great Protestant alliance, which bears many analogies to Cromwell's project of thirty years later, but which was too thorough-going for the timid Stuart court. James was in no position to meet its financial requirements, and the more moderate proposals of Christian IV. were accepted instead. Gustavus Adolphus was compelled to resign his mission for a time to weaker and less worthy hands.

¹ De diplomatiska förbindelserna mellan Sverige och England 1624–Maj 1630. Akad. afh. af Aron Rydfors, Upsala, 1890. De diplomatiska förbindelserna mellan Sverige och England 1633–54. Akad. afh. af August Heimer, Lund, 1892. Gardiner's English History, 1603–1642. Ib., 1642–49. History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, vol. i., 1649–52.

Restitution of the Palatinate.—In so far as Charles I. could be said to have had a definite foreign policy at all, it had but one object, the restitution of the Palatinate to his relations. In this of itself Gustavus Adolphus had no interest, and there seemed but little chance of an agreement between them. Yet, as Charles blundered in every direction, he must sometimes blunder in the direction of Sweden. There were several times when his interference in behalf of the German Protestants seemed imminent.

In 1629, Sir Thomas Roe, an ardent advocate of a vigorous Protestant policy, was allowed to mediate a peace between Poland and Sweden, in order that Gustavus Adolphus might have free hand to interfere in Germany, though Charles would not promise in advance any active support. It was thus due to English influence under Sir Thomas Roe that Gustavus Adolphus was able to make his descent upon Germany in the summer of 1630.

The victories of Gustavus Adolphus roused the greatest enthusiasm among the English people, but not in the English Court. Yet even Charles, moved by the ill success of his negotiations with Spain, France, and Austria,¹ found himself, as if by accident, drifting with the current of national feeling. Sir Henry Vane was sent to Germany in the latter part of 1631 to treat for an alliance for “the restitution of both Palatinates and the liberty of Germany.” Gustavus Adolphus, however, inconsiderately demanded men and money as the price of his assistance. An English fleet must protect his communications with Sweden, and the military resources of the Palatinate, in case it were restored, must be placed at his disposal during the continuance of the war. Otherwise he had no interest in the project. The English Privy Council urged upon Charles the acceptance of these terms, but he found them too straightforward. They might bring him into collision with France or Spain. He therefore proposed instead a subsidy of £10,000 a month, for which the Swedish king must use every possible endeavor to restore the Palatinate. This proposal was rejected. Gustavus Adolphus knew very well how little Charles’ promises to pay money could be relied upon.

So deep was the emotion aroused in England by the Swedish

¹The clearest account of this part of Charles’ tortuous policy is given by Gardiner, English History, 1603-1642, vii., 169-219.

victories in Germany, that Charles saw in it a reproach against his own inactivity and thought it necessary to prohibit the gazettes from publishing news of them. Nothing could show more strikingly his failure to identify himself with the spirit of his people. It was the fatal difference between Tudor and Stuart absolutism. Charles received the news of the death of Gustavus Adolphus, which seemed to the English people a national disaster, with the greatest equanimity. It would be easy now, he thought, for Frederick V. to place himself at the head of the German Protestants and to win back his own. He sent him £16,000 for this purpose, but Frederick died before he heard what was expected of him.

Another opportunity for making English influence felt in Germany offered itself in the formation of the League of Heilbronn. The League in its weakness had been obliged to accept French support, and consequently to submit to French control, but it was anxious to balance the influence of France by that of England. It promised to do all that could be reasonably expected toward restoring the Palatinate. Yet Charles could not resign hope of gaining his object with less trouble through negotiation with Spain, and against the advice of his Council, he allowed this opportunity to slip. John Oxenstierna, son of the great Swedish chancellor, came to England to ask for assistance, but though he was received with every show of respect, he accomplished nothing. Somewhat later, Charles sent one ambassador after another to Sweden, but his foreign policy had long lost all coherence.¹ Even his own councilors were in the dark as to his true aims. As an inevitable result, he ceased to be courted. After the battle of Nördlingen, which he regarded with the greatest equanimity, he sent the usual hollow promises to Oxenstierna, but "the Swedish chancellor rode off to negotiate with the French ambassador without vouchsafing a word in answer." Charles' duplicity had isolated England and driven the Swedes and the German Protestants into the arms of France.²

During the Long Parliament and the Republic.—The relations be-

¹ "The schemes of Charles were so complicated and unreal, that they only serve to make the brain dizzy." Gardiner, Eng. Hist., 1603-1642, vii., 352.

² "No word of condemnation is too strong for the manner in which Charles treated the whole subject of his relations with the Continent. It had all the weakness of a purely selfish policy, without any of the apparent and momentary strength which a selfish policy receives from vigour of conception and boldness of action." 1b., 391.

tween Charles and Sweden were thus far from cordial at the beginning of the English Civil War. In fact, Swedish sympathies were so strongly with the rebellious Scotch that in 1640 ships and ammunition were promised them in case of necessity, though under the disguise of purchase. Oxenstierna was no friend to rebels, yet "he enumerated the breaches of the laws of the land which Charles had been guilty of, both in political and religious matters,"¹ and thought that under certain conditions rebellion was justifiable.

Nor was the cordiality which existed between Charles and his uncle, the king of Denmark, calculated to conciliate the Swedes. It was difficult to be a friend to Denmark and not an enemy to Sweden. When the war broke out between these two powers in 1643, an ambassador was sent by Sweden to the English Parliament asking for the coöperation of an English fleet in protecting commerce in the Baltic Sea—*i. e.*, in operating against Denmark. The immediate cause for seeking this alliance with the English Parliament, however, disappeared after the Treaty of Bromsebro, and in deference to the feelings of the French, the negotiations were broken off, although the English Parliament was, in consequence of rumors of a Danish-French agreement to come to the aid of Charles, more anxious than ever to proceed with them.

The execution of Charles I. brought with it naturally enough a certain revolution of feeling in favor of his successor. Spiring Silvercrona, the Swedish resident at the Hague, received orders to visit Charles II., and to show him the same respect as though he were in full possession of his royal authority. Yet when Montrose in his tour of the northern courts reached Gothenburg, expecting great things, he was sadly disappointed. Christina sold him a small ship, but had no further help to offer. Great as had been the outcry throughout Europe at the execution of Charles I., the cause of his successor was not regarded as it would have been one hundred and fifty years later, as the cause of kings.² No European court would hesitate to desert him if it served its interests to do so. The reasons why Sweden was again driven to seek the friendship of the English Parliament must be sought, as before, in its relations with Denmark.³

¹ Heimer, p. 43, *seq.*

² Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, xi., § 250.

³ Perhaps Christina had already conceived that great admiration for Cromwell which she

The treaties of Bromsebro and Westphalia had so strengthened the influence of Sweden in the Baltic that the United Provinces could not but be apprehensive of the future of their commerce, and they were endeavoring to maintain the balance of power in that region by supporting Denmark against its too powerful rival. In February, 1649, a defensive alliance was formed between them, although the Swedish envoys at the Hague, Appelboom and Spiring Silvercrona, made every effort to prevent it. Spiring had not only been instructed to cultivate the friendship of the English ambassadors at the Hague, but in certain events to recognize the Commonwealth, and to inform them that an English embassy would be well received in Sweden. He now proposed to the queen that he be sent to London to prevent the success of the negotiations for an English-Dutch alliance which were being carried on there. The proposal was received with favor. His letter of credence was dated at Stockholm, September 26, 1651.¹ His instructions related merely to the protection of commerce between the two nations and to the sending of an English ambassador to Sweden to carry on further negotiations. He died, however, before he had received audience, so the nature of the proposals which he was authorized to make remained unknown to Parliament. A letter of condolence was sent to the queen on the event.² Both Denmark and the States General had thought it necessary to send embassies to England to counteract the efforts of Sweden. Even France took the opportunity to make advances to Parliament through the Swedish ambassador.³

A few months after Spiring's death, Appelboom was sent over from Holland for a short time to continue the negotiations. His instructions contained proposals for transferring the English-Russian trade

afterwards expressed so freely. "I may tell you this wild queen of Swede extols beyond measure the Pr. of Condé and Cromwell," wrote Sec. Nicholas, December 8, 1654 (Nicholas Papers, ii., 142), "and speaks very slightly both of our blessed Master that is with God and of the K., whose shoes she is not worthy to tie." See also 1b., 142, and various passages in Whitelocke's Journal of the Swedish Embassy. Cromwell once sent his picture to her with a very elaborate compliment (usually printed among Milton's poetical works; but Masson thinks it was written by Marwell. Milton's Poetical Works, ii., 343, *seq.*), but after her apostasy he would hear nothing more of her. Whitelocke's Memorials of English Affairs, 599.

¹ A translation is contained in the Tanner Papers, Iv., fol. 64. It was to the effect that "the friendship and nearness of commerce which from ancient times and even to this day uninterrupted hath flourished between the Swedish and English nations may more and more for the future be rooted and moreover receive greater increase." It is indorsed, "Read, 27 January, 1651[2]."

² A copy is among the Tanner Papers, li., fol. 219. He died February 9, 1652.

³ Heimer, 77, *seq.*

from Archangel to Narva, Reval, and Nyea, which afterwards figured so prominently in Bonde's mission. He was also to try to mediate an agreement between England and France.

Toward the latter part of the year Benjamin Bonnell was commissioned as Swedish resident in London.¹ On April 7, 1653, Israel Lagerfeldt arrived, ostensibly to mediate a peace between England and the Dutch on the ground of "the peace and welfare of the Protestant churches," but in reality for a very different purpose. The spirit and object of his mission is shown by the much debated proposal which he made on August 3, 1653, to the effect that the Swedes should "contribute all their endeavours" to supply the English with such materials of war at a reasonable price as they needed from the North (copper, iron, hemp, masts, etc.), in return for the privilege of fishing off the coast of Great Britain; but this was to be on condition that Swedish vessels should suffer no further molestation and capture by English ships of war.² The letter of Parliament to the queen on Lagerfeldt's return is dated October 29, 1653.³ Bonnell was continued as resident until 1655.

*Whitelocke's Embassy, 1654.*⁴—Appelboom had found the English, now that their relations with Holland were becoming strained, very eager to close an alliance with Sweden, and they were much disappointed that he did not remain to complete it. Hitherto all advances had been made by Sweden. They were now to come from Parliament. On December 23, 1652, even before Lagerfeldt's arrival, it was determined to send an ambassador thither, and on December 31 Viscount Lisle was selected. His instructions⁵ were not ready till March 22, 1653. After the expulsion of the Rump, however, he asked to be excused on the plea of ill health, and it was decided to send Richard Salwey and Mr. Strickland in his stead.⁶ But Salwey

¹ Tanner Papers, liii., fol. 141. Dated October 23, 1652. "Read 22d of February, 1652[3]."

² Lagerfeldt's mission is usually referred to as though its only significance lay in its religious character, of which, in fact, it had very little. There is a manuscript volume in the Public Record Office, "Council of State: Negotiations with Sweden," S. P. Sweden, xi., containing copies of the various letters, papers, etc., exchanged in the course of the negotiations, in which little effort is made to conceal their real nature.

³ Tanner Papers, liii., fol. 57. His letter of credence was dated January 20, 1653.

⁴ Whitelocke's Journals of the Swedish Embassy, Reeve's edition. Ranke, Eng. Gesch., iii., 459. Heimer, ch. iv. Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, 149, seq. Thurloe State Papers, vols. i. and ii. There are many papers relating to this embassy in the private collection of the Marquis of Bath. Hist. MSS. Commission, 3d Rept., App., p. 192.

⁵ Thurloe State Papers, i., 227.

⁶ Earl of Westmoreland's Papers, Hist. MSS. Comm., 10th Rept., App. 4, p. 410. Cromwell to

begged to be excused on the ground of "unfituess through want of freedom of spirit and bodily health." The Swedish embassy was never popular and it was difficult to persuade any one to undertake it. Finally, however, Whitelocke was frightened into accepting it.¹ He left England on the 6th of November and arrived at Upsala on the 20th of December, 1653.

Whitelocke's instructions² were identical with those of Lisle except in one point; but the difference is noteworthy. The war with the Dutch had in the meantime lost some of its bitterness, and some of the more severe paragraphs relating to them were omitted. Yet even with this mitigation, the significance of the embassy still lay in its hostility to Holland. Whatever expressions may have been used pointing to an underlying religious motive,³ these only give evidence of the extent to which religious feeling prevailed public life in England at this time; but in the course of the negotiations these motives have no material significance.⁴ When Whitelocke in his first private audience with the queen dwelt upon religious matters, he was met with pleasant raillery. "Methinks you preach very well, and have now made a good sermon," she said. In his next interview, however, when he showed her a list of the Parliamentary fleet, her demeanor was very different. "This is a gallant navy indeed," she said; "I am exceedingly taken with the description of it. * * * Some of these ships of yours would do good service to open the Sound. What do you think fit to be taken

R. Salwey, August 11, 1653, informing him that the Council desires to send him with Mr. Strickland to "Swethesland, a thing too long neglected by us already, and may be of greater importance than any design we have of that kind anywhere else." Somewhat later, Cromwell spoke in a similar strain of the relations between England and Sweden. "And the business is of exceeding great importance to the Commonwealth, as any can be; that it is: and there is no prince or State in Christe dom with whom there is any probability for us to have a friendship, but only the queen of Sweden." Whitelocke's Swedish Embassy, p. 14.

¹ "Rather to go the journey in great danger than to stay at home in greater." Whitelocke's Swedish Embassy, i., 35.

² *ibid.* i., 85, *seq.* The public instructions were dated October 21, 1653, the private instructions a week later

³ *Ib.* i., 29, *seq.* Advantages of the Embassy to the Protestant Cause.

⁴ Even with Cromwell this motive does not appear to be nearly so prominent as it afterwards became "If I find the queen willing to join with you," asked Whitelocke, "for the gaining of the Sound, and against the Dutch and Danes, and that heartily and hopefully, shall I put that business to the utmost and are you willing to enter into such a conjunction?" To which Cromwell replied, "If you find them inclinable to it, put it on as far as you can, and let us hear from you what you judge best to be done in it. No business can be of greater consequence to us and our trade, wherein the Dutch will endeavour to overreach us; and it were good to prevent them and the Dane, and first to serve our own interest." Whitelocke's Swedish Embassy, i., 94.

to open and make free the passage thereof?" "It cannot be taken out of their [the Danes'] hands but by force," she continued. "Do you think that the Commonwealth of England will give assistance in that business?" "Madam, I think they will," replied Whitelocke, "upon such just and honourable terms as may be agreed." "Do you think they will send any ships for that purpose?" "I believe upon fit terms they will." "What would you propose as fit to be done in that business?"¹ Here was the real point of contact between English and Swedish interests.

The old Chancellor Oxenstierna, however, held back. He was too clear-sighted not to see what far-reaching changes in Sweden's policy such an alliance would have. He also questioned the stability of the existing government in England, although his fears were somewhat allayed by Cromwell's assuming the title of Protector. Pimentelli, the Spanish ambassador, who had much influence at court, advised Whitelocke to negotiate directly with the queen. But although she took much interest in the project of an alliance between Sweden, England, and Spain which Pimentelli proposed to meet the existing alliance between Denmark, the Netherlands, and France, she was too much occupied with her abdication to exert her authority in other matters. When Pimentelli found Whitelocke not inclined to admit Spain into the alliance, he too used his influence against it.

Erik Oxenstierna, who conducted the negotiations during the illness of his father, placed the greatest stress upon commercial matters, desiring permission for Swedish subjects to trade with America, and to fish on the coasts of Great Britain, and that English traders might be established at Narva, Reval, and Gothenburg; but Whitelocke proposed that these matters be left to future negotiations in England. The time was in fact unfavorable for deciding momentous questions of policy. The accession of a new sovereign and the close of the Dntch war might bring changes in the council of both Sweden and England. It was therefore thought best to leave the matter undecided. The treaty which bears the date April 11, but which was not really concluded till April 28, provides in general terms for "a good, firm, sincere, and perpetual peace, amity, alliance, and correspondence," but leaves all means by which the alliance would be made

¹ Whitelocke's Swedish Embassy, i., 258, *seq.*

effective to further negotiations, for which purpose it was understood an ambassador would be sent to England.

The treaty was but an expression, in general terms, of friendship and amity and was in fact a postponement of the whole matter. On May 20, Whitelocke took his departure, two weeks before the accession of the new sovereign who was to continue, though under very different circumstances, the policy of interference on the continent which had been inaugurated by his uncle, Gustavus Adolphus.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CROMWELL AND CHARLES GUSTAVUS.

Revival of Swedish Aggression and Necessity of English Support.—Ever since Sweden had emerged under Gustavus Adolphus from its position of comparative isolation it had been driven to seek English aid in its undertakings on the continent. The two nations seemed not only by their community of religion and similarity of national character, but by their mutual interest in opposing the commercial supremacy of the Dutch, as if destined by nature to be each other's allies.¹ When Charles Gustavus on his accession to the Swedish crown set out in his “endeavour to follow the example of his famous predecessors, whieh was to enlarge as well as defend their dominions,”² he was likely, in view of the resentment already aroused by Swedish aggression, to need English aid more than ever; for, with all the brilliant successes which had crowned Swedish arms, its position with regard to its neighbors at this time was a desperate one. Each success had been at the expense of some other state, until its extended border was threatened by an unbroken circle of foes. Denmark was smarting under the disgrace of the treaty of Bromsebro, by which it had lost not only the provinces of Holland, Jämtland, Herjeådalen, and the islands Gotland and Oesel, but also its monopoly of the tolls in the Sound. Brandenburg had been alienated by the loss of Pommerania and the petty acts of violence in settling its boundary. Mecklenburg had lost Wismar and the customs duties in its remaining ports. The German Empire had been brought into a position of commercial dependence, and had been compelled to yield to the Swedish intruder a voice in its imperial government. Ferdinand III. had many old

¹ Whitelocke's *Memorials of English Affairs*, 602. Also Lagerfeldt in the volume mentioned above. S. P. Sweden, xi. “For God and nature having so seated these two lands and nations, that neither a too great distance between both can deprive them of all communication, or render it difficult, nor a too great vicinity make them obnoxious to the fatal animosities incident ordinarily to neighbors.” This was a favorite argument at that time.

² “The most Heavenly and Christian Speech of the Magnanimous and Victorious King of Sweden, Charles Gustavus Adolphus, on his Death-Bed, etc.” Pamphlet, London, 1660.

scores to settle, both as emperor of Germany and as king of Hungary. Poland, like Denmark, was in a state of chronic hostility, for various reasons, among others from the loss of territory. Finally, the rising Russian power was already conscious of the necessity of piercing the slender slip of Swedish territory which threatened to transform the Baltic into an inland sea. Some or all of these powers were only waiting for a favorable opportunity to turn the scale of fortune. To all this came a crowning danger. The success which had attended Sweden's efforts to get possession of the Baltic ports for the purpose of controlling trade, had brought with it the uncompromising hostility of the Dutch. Any attempt to extend this oppressive rule would inevitably be met by the despatch of an overwhelming Dutch fleet into the Baltic, the very heart of the Swedish dominions.

It would seem as if Charles Gustavus' safest course under the circumstances would have been to adopt a waiting policy with Walpole's motto, *Quieta non movere*. But internal difficulties prevented. Sweden was too poor to wait. Its army must be kept together at all hazards, which could only be done by throwing the expense of its maintenance upon Sweden's enemies, *i. e.*, by declaring war.

But against whom? The extreme danger of setting the surrounding hostile forces in motion was not lost sight of. Christopher Bonde called the attention of the Swedish Council to the special danger from the side of the Dutch, in which opinion he was seconded by Wrangel and Wittenberg.¹ He argued that if, as had been proposed, Poland were made the seat of the war which they were about to declare, and Sweden thus left exposed, it must not be expected that Denmark and Holland, to say nothing of the German princes, would remain idle spectators. Affairs in this quarter must first be made secure by a double attack on Denmark, from Sweden and from Bremen. After the Danes had been subdued and the slow-acting States General not only divided and disconcerted, but fearful of renewed hostilities on the part of the English,² the war against Poland might be undertaken with-

¹ *Bedenken des Schwedischen Senats, über die Frage: Wer von den benachbarten Potentaten, weil Krieg zu führen nötig erachtet worden, zu attaquaren sei?* Lünig, *Staats-Concilia*, ii., 557. This meeting of the Council was held December 11, 1654. See, also, Carlson, *Schwedische Geschichte*, iv., 39, *seq.* Following an ancient custom, two speakers were chosen to conduct the debate on the question under consideration. Christopher Bonde was chosen to defend the policy of renewing the war.

² Pufendorff, *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo gestis*, lib. i., § 57.

out unduly exposing Sweden. But to this argument answer was made, and sustained by the opinion of the Council, that any serious menace to Denmark's existence or welfare would be resented not only by the Germans and Dutch but by the English as well;¹ an opinion which subsequent events proved to be well founded.

The Swedish statesmen thus found themselves confronted with a dilemma, either horn of which threatened to involve them in a war with Holland, to whose maritime strength Sweden was particularly vulnerable. There seemed but one alternative open, to secure the support of a maritime power strong enough to hold the Dutch in check; and who should this be but the enemies of Holland, the English? It was possible, it is true, that this English aid might be dispensed with. If Sweden's enemies were numerous, they were also weak and divided, and no one could tell what effect a bold attack might have, or what circumstances might arise to prevent them from uniting. Yet, on the other hand, English support might prove to be the very keystone to the whole Swedish position.

Appointment of Swedish Ambassadors.—That Charles Gustavus appreciated from the first the importance which his relations with England might have, there is abundant evidence to show.² It was some months before his plans began to take definite form,³ and it was of course desirable to postpone the formal embassy to England until they had been fully matured. But, in the meantime, a disquieting rumor, trifling in itself, showed the desirability of having a representative at Westminster to counteract certain influences unfriendly to Sweden which appeared to be at work there. It was said that Cromwell had expressed his surprise that Danzig and the Hanse towns had not offered their mediation between Sweden and Poland, since their interests lay so clearly in the maintenance of peace. This report troubled Charles Gustavus exceedingly. It was true the Protector could hardly be expected, now that he was at peace with both Denmark and Holland, to be as anxious for an alliance with Sweden as he had been the year before; but could it be that he was now inclined to join these

¹ "Und die Deutschen, Holl- und Engelländer werden es niemals zugeben, dass Dänemark von Schweden unterdrückt, und die Nordischen Königreiche in eine, allen Nachbarn formidable Monarchie gebracht werden sollten." Lünig, *Staats-Concilia*, ii., 557.

² For example, the favor shown to Whitelocke. *Swedish Embassy*, ii., 256 and 261.

³ "Ännu i slutet af 1654 sväfande och obeständiga, antog dessa [konungens planer för den utrikes politiken] småningom en fastare gestalt." Carlson, i., 88 (German trans., iv., 76).

powers whose interests lay in maintaining peace in the North? It was decided to send an informal embassy to England to inquire whether this report was true. Peter Julius Coyet¹ was chosen for the mission. His departure was delayed for some time by Cromwell's delay in the exchange of certain formalities,² until a sharp reminder through the Swedish resident in London set the matter right. His instructions were dated November 25, 1654. He sailed from Gothenburg early in December, but did not reach London till March, being some three months on the way. The object of his embassy was to obtain the ear of the Protector in order to present the king's plans in a favorable light and to meet any misrepresentations which the Dutch or others might make as to his intentions, and, in general, to prepare the way for the more formal embassy which was to follow.³

Coyet was followed shortly by George Fleetwood, an Englishman in Swedish service, whose appointment proved to be exceedingly important on account of his connection with Cromwell's family.⁴ He

¹ Coyet was secretary and assessor in the Swedish *commerce collegium*, and in high favor with Charles Gustavus. He was only thirty-six years old, of handsome presence, we are told, and of considerable scientific and linguistic attainments. His name appears often in the records of the following negotiations, and the part he played, though not distinguishable from that of his colleagues, seems to have been important. Cromwell testified his regard by making him Knight of the Garter, and by a valuable present and a letter to Charles Gustavus commanding him highly (Milton, *Literæ*, 117). He played an important part in subsequent Swedish affairs, being one of the principal Swedish negotiators of the treaty of Roeskilde.

² As soon as the festivities attending his coronation ceremony were over, Charles Gustavus had sent a letter to Cromwell announcing his accession and expressing a desire to maintain the existing friendship with him (Thurloe, State Papers, ii., 37). Cromwell answered in a similar strain (Milton, *Literæ*, 78), but though his reply is dated July 4 (or July 14; see Mason's Life of Milton, iv., 636), it was not sent for some time, as I suspect through motives of economy. He hoped some less expensive way would present itself for presenting his compliments than through a special envoy. (See Coyet's instructions, § 8, in which he is told to decline to carry the Protector's ratification of the treaty of Upsala back for him, in case he should be asked to.) The delay caused some apprehension in Sweden. Not only was Coyet held back by it, but it might indicate an indifference on Cromwell's part. There appears to be some correspondence in the Swedish archives between Coyet and Oxenstierna concerning the matter. See Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, note 15, p. 352.

³ Coyet's instructions have been printed by Treffenberg, "K. Carl X Gustafs instruction för Secreteraren Coyet under dess beskickning till England år 1654. Ur Upsala Universitets Hand-skriftsamlingar. Akad. afh. Upsala, 1851." Pufendorff gives a more convenient summary of their contents in two passages, lib. i., § 9, and lib. ii., § 86, to the latter of which the reader is referred for details. Pufendorff, however, mentions some matters not included in the instructions of November 25, for which I have not been able to trace his authority; but they probably rest upon some subsequent instructions. See Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, 130.

⁴ His brother, Charles Fleetwood, was Cromwell's son-in-law, and held a leading position in the Protector's court. He was lord-deputy of Ireland, a member of the council of state, one of the major-generals, and the officer highest in rank in the armies of the three kingdoms. He was in complete accord with both Cromwell's foreign and domestic policy, and was so high in favor that it was said Cromwell intended him to be his successor. He was absent in Ireland when his brother was sent as envoy extraordinary to England, but he returned in September,

was to proceed to England under the pretense of looking after his private interests, and was to sound Cromwell's attitude towards Sweden and the prospects for a closer alliance, together with the conditions which Cromwell might be expected to demand, and also to obtain permission to enlist six or eight thousand Scottish recruits for Swedish service. His instructions were dated May 15, but he did not reach London until July.

But the principal embassy was entrusted to Christopher Bonde. That Charles Gustavus should dispatch three envoys to England within so short a time shows what importance he attached to his relations with that country. If this needed further confirmation, it is furnished by the fact that the one first intended for this principal embassy was none other than Erik Oxenstierna, the Swedish chancellor, who directed the foreign affairs of Sweden from October, 1654, till his death.¹ The news that he might be expected was received with satisfaction in England as a special mark of honor, but the press of business required his presence at home, and Christopher Bonde, who stood next to him in the *commerce collegium*, was named in his stead.² In view of Bonde's warning against the Dutch, which we have already noticed, and his extensive knowledge of matters of trade, with which his negotiations were expected to be chiefly concerned, his appointment appeared to be a most appropriate one.

Bonde's instructions were dated June 14, 1655.³ So far as the

1655. George Fleetwood entered Swedish service in 1629, when he conducted a troop of horse which he had raised in England to Gustavus Adolphus' aid. He rendered important services to Sweden, and received many honors in recognition of them. He was made successively Swedish knight, baron, lieutenant-general, and member of the council of war. This was his third mission to England. The other two missions, in 1630 and 1636, respectively, had also the object of raising troops for Swedish service, and both of them had been successful. The influence which he was able to exert in England was so considerable that he was retained at the post until 1660. He must be carefully distinguished from George Fleetwood, the regicide, whose name appears so often in English records of this date, else one will be sorely puzzled at the double role which he seems to be playing.

¹ Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, 222. He died October 28, 1656.

² Bonde was one of the most trusted of Charles Gustavus' councilors, "a God-fearing, honorable, eloquent, and learned man," whom even his political enemies spoke of with respect. He had studied at Oxford in his youth, and probably had a fair knowledge of the English language and of English ways, which must have been of great value to him at the Protector's court, where Latin was not extensively cultivated. Though he was but thirty-three years of age, he had already filled important positions, and was a member of several Swedish councils. But he was most at home in matters of administration and trade, in which he appears to have had Charles Gustavus' absolute confidence, especially in his somewhat ambitious plan for breaking up the Dutch monopoly of trade in the Baltic.

³ Riksregister. A copy is in the library of the University of Upsala. So far as I can discover, they have not been printed and I have been compelled to rely solely on Pufendorff, ii., § 88.

points left by the treaty of Upsala to be determined by further negotiations are concerned, they are essentially the same as those of Coyet. But as concerned the question of a closer alliance, it was otherwise. In place of mere suggestion or inquiries, he was authorized to make a definite proposal in the following terms: Cromwell should, in return for concessions in point of trade, place at the king's disposal and maintain at his own expense, as long as it might prove necessary, twenty ships of war, fully equipped and manned; he should further guarantee the safety of the English Channel and the open sea for Swedish commerce, should allow the king to recruit soldiers in England and to hire ships, and should grant to Swedish merchants certain advantages in England over other foreigners, the exact nature of which was not stated.

The concessions which were to be offered in return for this support were, it must be said, indefinite and illusory. The king engaged not to interfere with English commerce in such ports and lands as he should conquer; the English staple in Danzig would not be interfered with, and might even be transferred to Riga; English ships would be allowed the same advantages in Swedish ports as Swedish ships designated half-free,¹ provided the English would grant equal privileges to Swedish ships in other places, or some equivalent advantage. Bonde was also instructed to call the Protector's attention to the extraordinary value of the Baltic trade, and the possibility for still greater expansion, the undeveloped resources of the surrounding country and the rivers which flowed into it. The advantages of this trade had hitherto been reaped by the Dutch, but the king was now anxious to divide it with the Protector in return for the support which he asked. Thus behind the immediate grounds for seeking an English alliance is the shadow of this great project involving the destruction of the Dutch as a maritime and sea power. *Dominium maris baltici* in the hands of this ambitious prince would have become not merely the means of plundering the Dutch trade through exorbitant tolls, but the means of supplanting it altogether.² The manner in which he would divide

¹ Swedish free, half-free, and ordinary ships paid duties in the ratio of 3, 4, and 5 respectively.

² These plans were not entirely unknown in Holland. See, for example, the pamphlet entitled "Copye Translaet, van seecker Sweedsen Brief gescreven aan den Konick van Sweeden, etc., door desselfs Rycks-Raedt, Heer Christer Bonde, etc., waer van de geintercypieerde Origenee noch voor handen, ende onder anderen klaerlijck daer uyt te lesen is, Hoe ende Waerom de Sweeden tracten, de geheele Oosterse Negocie en commercie van Amsterdam nae andere

the spoils with his English ally, however, was left for the future to decide.

Bonde's Arrival in England; Influence of the Dutch.—As his royal master was on the point of embarking for Poland, Bonde sailed for England on the 16th of June, 1654, with a stately train of no less than 200 attendants, "all generally proper and handsome men," and arrived at Gravesend on the 18th of July.¹ He was met on the following day by Coyet, who gave him a most flattering account of the Protector's attitude. The king's plans in the Baltic, he said, stood in no danger of being interrupted; the Protector had spoken very openly with him. On the 28th of July, Bonde was conducted to London by the Protector's master of ceremonies, Oliver Fleming, where he was met by Whitelocke and Strickland on behalf of the Council. Three days of generous entertainment followed, after which came the first public audience.² "No ambassador had been received with such elaborate ceremony since the late king's execution," wrote one of Bonde's suite.³ However, notwithstanding this flattering reception, the ground had been made somewhat unfavorable for Bonde by the well directed efforts of the Dutch ambassador, Nieupoort. After the treaty of peace between England and the States General in 1654, Nieupoort had remained in England to negotiate a further treaty concerning matters of trade and to obtain some relaxation of English measures directed against Dutch commerce.⁴ When Charles Gustavus' intention of renewing the war in the North was no longer concealed, it became his duty to keep in touch with the Protector's views concerning affairs in this region.

The republican party in Holland under the leadership of De Witt had many interests in common with Cromwell, and it was by no means impossible that the two leaders might agree upon a common policy in

Plaetsem en Quartieren, jae, uyt Holland selfs, (was 't mogelyck) op Vreemde Ghewesten te diverteren, tot af breuck en ruyne van de goede Ingeseetenen van de Provantie van Hollant en West-Vrieslandt, als mede der Stadt Amsterdam voorsz. Copenhage, 16-26 October, 1658."

¹ Carlson gives several incorrect dates with reference to these embassies to England.

² This is described in detail by Whitelocke, in *Memorials of English Affairs*, 626. Whitelocke's description has been used by Masson in his account of Bonde's embassy. *Life of Milton in Connection with the History of his Time*, v., 246, *seq.*

³ Extracts of Johan Ekeblad's letters have been published in Wieselgren's *Dela Gardiska Archivet*, viii., 216, *seq.* They bear evidence to the spirit of exalting confidence which pervaded the embassy. "The Dutch ask trembling what the king proposes to do," he wrote. "The Sultan of Turkey sent an envoy to the Prince of Siebenbürgen to enquire about this king who swallows up whole kingdoms; what lands he had, where they lay, etc."

⁴ De Witt's *Brieven*, vol. iii., and Aitzema, *Saken van Staet en Oorlogh*, vol. iii., 1155, *seq.*

the North. On May 7, 1655,¹ Nieupoort wrote that news of the siege of Danzig by the king of Sweden had arrived in London, causing much uneasiness among English merchants. He thought a proposition for an alliance between England, Denmark, and the Netherlands for the protection of the Baltic trade might be listened to. Brandenburg, however, was distrusted in England and could not be included. In his next dispatch, May 14, he tells of two conferences which he had with Thurloe in which his references to a possible alliance had been well received. The Protector, he was told, had considered the matter with his Council and Nieupoort's suggestions had been most agreeable. The Protector had expressed his surprise that Danzig did not try to secure allies. It was evident that the king of Sweden's movements were a source of some apprehension in England. On June 10, Holland ordered Nieupoort to propose to the Protector an alliance with Denmark and the Netherlands for the preservation of the Baltic trade.²

Yet it will be remembered that at this same time Coyet was receiving assurances from the Protector which he considered very satisfactory. It might appear at first sight as though the Protector was playing a double and confused part; but it seems sufficiently clear that this was not the case. A clue to his motives is furnished by Nieupoort's account of certain conferences with Thurloe. On the news of the massacres in Piedmont, Cromwell had sent letters to the various powers in Europe protesting or exhorting, as the case was, and among others to the king of Sweden.³ As soon as Charles Gustavus' answer had been received, said Thurloe, they could then confer together as to what course it would be best to adopt. The Protector's policy would be largely influenced by the nature of the king of Sweden's reply; in the meantime, he could be assured that nothing would be done to prejudice the interests of Holland. It would be a great thing, continued Nieupoort, anticipating the Protector's whole policy in the North, if the king of Sweden could be moved, even if through a subsidy, to turn his arms from the Protestant places in Prussia against the Roman Catholics in the hereditary lands of the emperor, and to consent to an agreement

¹ All of Nieupoort's and Bordeaux's dispatches are dated according to the present mode of reckoning.

² *Secrete Resolntien*, i., 186. Pufendorff mentions Brandenburg and Poland in this connection, but the attempt to reconcile England and Brandenburg was a different matter, and was kept separate by the Dutch. The mention of Poland seems to be an error.

³ Milton, *Literæ*, 91; but undated. The date is May 25.

with Holland, or with Holland, Denmark, and England, for the regulation of commerce in the Baltic.¹ Soon after, he suggested to Thurloe that Charles Gustavus might be persuaded to leave Danzig and Prussia undisturbed and seek his advantage in other quarters; to which Thurloe had replied that he would do what he could to further such result.² On July 9, Nieupoort wrote of an interview in which the Protector had said that "he also would rather that the king of Sweden would leave the seaports unmolested and seek his advantage in the hereditary lands in the house of Austria, to which he would contribute what he could, and that he, too, understood perfectly the consequences of the present Swedish designs." The plan of a common movement against Austria was quite in keeping with the negotiations with France which he was then carrying on, and which Nieupoort was trying, not without some influence, to further.

Such was the state of affairs on Bonde's arrival in England. Nieupoort, though he stood well with the Protector, and had actually anticipated and proposed the policy which the Protector was then cherishing and afterwards followed so persistently, was openly expressing his suspicion that England and Sweden had come to a secret understanding,³ and was receiving in return assurances that the alliance with Holland was the very ground and foundation upon which subsequent treaties must rest.⁴ Cromwell, on his part, was uneasy at Sweden's designs against Prussia, and was not at all inclined to permit them. Not only was Charles Gustavus embarking in his new war without first consulting the Protector,⁵ but his relations with Charles II., though they had no particular significance, may have added to the

¹ " * * * ende versoght my, dat wy niet jalours wilden wesen, dat nogh met dien Koningh nogh met iemant anders iet soude gehandelt werden tot prejudice van onsen Staet, ende als se antwoordt op den voorgeroerden brief souden onfangen hebben, dat men dan t'samen soude kunnen overleggen, wat best soude dienen gedaen to werden; Het sonde myns bedunekens al een groot werck wesen, koude die Koningh siende de animositeit van 't Pansdom in Savoyen, ende ook hoe de Roomsche Geestelykheit gestadigh woelt in de Erflanden van den Keyser, bewogen werden, al waere het met een geldt-subsidie, als voor desen Gustavus, omme syne Wapenen in plaatse van tegens Protestantse Steden in Pruyssen, in de voorgeoemde Erflanden tot afweringe van de voorgeroerde oppressien te willen gebruyeken, ende vernieuwen met onsen Staet ofte alleen, of gemeen met desen Staet ende Denemareken, een defensive Allianee met ons Reglement van de Commereie ende Navigatie op de Oost-zee." Nieupoort to De Witt, June 11, 1655.

² Nieupoort to De Witt, June 18, 1655.

³ *ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 30.

⁵ Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time, Stowe MSS., elxxxv., fol. 187.

Protector's distrust.¹ The polities of Europe were in fact in an unsettled and confused state, in which radical changes were easily possible, when the occurrence of the massacres in Piedmont decided the Protector as to a definite line of policy. The negotiations with France, the Netherlands, and Sweden came to a standstill until answers to Cromwell's letters on this subject had been received. A great deal depended upon the attitude of Sweden, and Bonde's arrival was awaited with keen interest.

Rumors and First Difficulties.—The brilliant audience and the subsequent courtesies shown the Swedish ambassador did not escape the attention of the foreign ministers at Westminster. The Protector showed Bonde great attention and often took him to Hampton Court. "The other ambassadors, who have been here a long time but can hardly obtain an interview with the Protector, are very jealous of us," wrote Ekeblad, "and cannot imagine why we are courted so." This conspicuous favoritism was thought to have great significance, as indeed it had; but those who had most to fear from an English-Swedish alliance inferred too much from it. "I have advertisement from England from a very good hand, that there has been long a very good understanding between the king of Sweden and Cromwell," wrote Charles II.'s secretary of state. "I have also advertisement, that Cromwell and the Swedish ambassador are exceedingly intimate. They dine, sup, hunt, and play at bowls together, and never was ambassador, or indeed any man, so much caressed and regarded by Cromwell as this man is (who is a person of great esteem in Swedland), nor did he ever seek the friendship of any one so much as of this king of Swede. Some believe that France will also join with these, but I know not how that may stand with the interest of France, for I am persuaded that Sweden and Cromwell will endeavour to render themselves the protectors of all the reformed churches in Germany, France, etc., or at least procure from them all a kind of dependence on these godly reformers. * * * I am persuaded that if there be any such close league between

¹ Charles Gustavus sent a letter to Charles II. announcing his accession, in which he gave him the title King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, and professed his good will and desire to assist. A copy of it, together with Charles' reply, came into Thurloe's hands (Clar. S. P., xlii., fol. 333). Correspondents sent in alarming rumors of intended Swedish aid to Charles II. Charles sent an ambassador, Sir Wm. Bellenden, to Sweden, who of course accomplished nothing. "The king is kindly disposed, but cannot alter at once what has been done by the queen," he wrote. Nicholas Papers, ii., 73. All this was of little or no importance, yet Cromwell was sensitive on this point, and it may have had some influence.

Cromwell and Sweden, one part of the design is to make Sweden master of the Baltic Sea, and that therein, and otherwise, it may prove as ruinous to the States as to many others.”¹

This rumor found credence elsewhere, to the benefit of both Cromwell and Charles Gustavus. On the one hand, Spain turned a deaf ear for a time to the appeals of Charles II.,² while on the other hand not only was Austria discouraged from actively supporting Poland,³ but the Dutch wisely refrained from assuming an aggressive attitude, which would certainly have offended the Protector and lessened the chances for a peaceful settlement.

However, notwithstanding these marked favors, Bonde’s efforts to hasten the negotiations met at first with no success. Bonde might receive the most dinners, but Nieupoort received the most conferences, and Dutch interests had full hearing. Bonde, like his royal master, stood very much on his dignity. He complained that there was no proper place for him to confer with any one. He could not visit Thurlloe at his house, like a private solicitor, he said, as the Dutch ambassador did. To be sure, commissioners were appointed to confer with him, with whom he had his first conference on August 15; but Strickland, who was thought to favor the Dutch strongly, was one of the number, which made Bonde cautious, while the commissioners on their part were extremely noncommittal. They dare not for their lives commit themselves to anything, he wrote. It was evident that while the Protector was willing to hear what Bonde had to propose, he was not prepared as yet to go further. Not only did his ill health, the negotiations with France, and other matters engage his attention at this time, but it was no easy matter to reconcile Charles Gustavus’ plans with his own. The very reason why the Swedes were so anxious for an English alliance was the reason why the English were unwilling

¹ Nicholas to Jos. Jane. S. P., Dom., Interreg., c., fol. 84.

² Charles II.’s ambassador at Madrid, Sir Henry Bennet, sent most discouraging reports. See letters to Hyde in Clarendon State Papers. “Indeed their [the Spaniards’] wariness in offending those [the English], who insult them upon every day with doing them new injuries, I cannot enough wonder at, or that they can still imagine it possible to enter upon a new treaty with them.” Hyde to Sir H. de Vic., Clar. S. P., I., fol. 233.

³ Pribram, Archiv für Oesterreichische Geschichte, lxxv., 430. Pribram, however, puts it a trifle too strong when he says, “Am Hofe Charles II. hat man nie gezweifelt dass welterschütternde Pläne getroffen waren.” They were strongly inclined to believe it, it is true, but they would hardly have sent an ambassador to Charles Gustavus (p. 28, note) had they not thought there was still some hope of the contrary. “*If there be any such close league,*” said Nicholas in the letter quoted above.

to grant it. Charles Fleetwood told Bonde in an important interview,¹ that "not only the Protector, but everybody who understood such matters, saw that a nearer alliance with Sweden was of the greatest importance to England, and that Bonde's proposals were most advantageous; but the cause of the long hesitancy had been the help which the king wished in the Baltic, which seemed directed against Holland. England was now at peace with that power, and the Protector considered himself in honor bound not to break it."² Another cause for the delay was the awaiting the outcome of the negotiations with France, to which the Piedmont incident had offered some hinderance.³ The choice between an alliance with France or Spain was the foundation upon which the Protector's whole foreign policy rested, and with it his policy in the North. He could not well proceed with the latter until the former had been settled beyond question. "The peace with France was followed with a war with Spain, and all future treaties were for the most part managed with some reference thereunto."⁴

Cromwell's Policy in the North.—The Piedmont massacres and the peace with France were two events which clarified the Protector's foreign relations. After this, his aims were clear and his methods of reaching them simple. It may perhaps be well at this point to take a more careful survey of Cromwell's policy in the North, of which we have already had glimpses in Nieupoort's letters.

In all the Protector's foreign relations, there were three objects which he never lost sight of: 1. The maintenance and extension of the Protestant religion. 2. The prevention of the restoration of Charles II. 3. The encouragement and protection of English trade.

1. The tendency of recent historians of the English Puritan Revolution is to lay greater stress on its religious character. That religious hatred which on the Continent had found free play in the Thirty Years' War, and had burnt itself out to a certain extent, had been pent up in England only to break out fiercer than ever in shame at the ignoble part England had played in this struggle. Cromwell shared with his party its over-wrought religious feeling, its savage intoler-

¹ October 23, 1655. Kalling, p. 27, *seq.*

² "De Heer Protector heeft my rondt uyt verseeckert, dat hy ten aensien van Sweden geen offres ofte invitatie, dat waeren de eygen woorden, soude aennemen als gemeen met Hollandt." Nieupoort to De Witt, October 29, 1655.

³ Nieupoort to De Witt, August 20, 1655.

⁴ Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time.

ance in matters of creed, and its constant dread of a violent Catholic reaction.¹ Already in January, 1654, he thought he saw clear signs of the coming storm. He informed the Swiss ambassador that the Pope had formed a plan for reconciling the ancient rivalry between France and Spain and turning their united arms against the Protestants, first in Switzerland and then in the rest of the world. An alliance between England, Switzerland, and the Netherlands seemed to him the only means of averting the disaster.² When the massacres occurred in Piedmont, the already excited public went into a panic over the event and saw in it only the beginning of a series of similar horrors, all instigated by the Romish Antichrist. The part which Cromwell played in this matter is well known. It seems to me, in fact, to mark the point at which his hitherto somewhat vague plans for a Protestant alliance took definite form.³ Considerations of religion took for a time precedence in his councils over all other interests (p. 41). A treaty with France was preferred to one with Spain for this among other reasons,⁴ and a plan for a Protestant counter-alliance was conceived which

¹ He also shared the prevailing illusion that Charles Gustavus was a second Gustavus Adolphus. See Kalling's account of his first private interview with Bonde, also his speech to Parliament, *post*. Even in Scotland this idea was prevalent among the Puritans. "A long tract of dreams I have on the success of Charles, if God help him to begin where his heroic uncle Gustave left, but all these I put in God's hands, who knoweth his own appointments." Letters and Journals of Robert Baille, A. M., Principal of the University of Glasgow, iii., 871. "For myself, since the battle of Leipsig, I have loved the house of Sweden to this day above all o'her foreigners, and by the strange successes God gives to their valour, I expect more good to the Church from them than from any others; however, that unhappy Christina's apostasy and after miscarriages, has grieved my heart." *Ibid.*, iii., 370. "I wish Brandenburg may return to his old postour, and not draw ou himself next the Swedish armies, which the Lord for-bid; for after Sweden, we love Brandenburg next." *Ibid.*, iii., 371. "Det gemena folket talar uppenbarligen på hörsen och gatorna, att alla lärda män hafva visat utaf Daniels Prophetia och andra skäl, att en Konung i Sverige och England skola omkullkasta Päfvarnas säte och gifva den sanna Guds åkallen åter sitt rätta flor och bruk igen." Bonde's letter of August 23, 1655. Kalling, p. 18, note 1.

² For this incident, as well as for the religious character of the Protector's policy in general, see Stern's "Oliver Cromwell und die evangelischen Kantone der Schweiz," in Sybel's Historische Zeitschrift, xl., pp. 52-99.

³ How prevalent the idea of a Protestant union was at that time, not only in England, but in the Protestant world at large, is shown by Rakoczy's sending an ambassador in the latter part of 1654 to Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and England, asking to be included in any such alliance which might be formed between them. The ambassador was everywhere well received. On May 4, 1655, he had audience in London, but it was May 24 before he was able to present his mission to the Protector. (The original is in the British Museum, Add. MSS., 4156, fol. 174.) Alexander Szilagyi, in Ungarische Revue, 1892, p. 635. The Protector took great interest in the Prince of Transylvania. Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 730.

⁴ "An alliance with France was most agreeable to the strict intelligence the Protector had, and intended to have with Sweden and other princes and states in those parts, which were of the same interest." Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. "He intended a good correspondence with the Protestants of France, and to lay the foundation thereof in his interpositions to the French king on their behalf, that their edict for liberty of conscience might be

should include not only the powers of the North, but Transylvania, Brandenburg, and even France. Brandenburg was given to understand that an ambassador would be well received in London and that the negotiations with Sweden would be delayed somewhat to that purpose.¹

2. This plan of a great Protestant alliance is the key to Cromwell's foreign policy. If it could be realized it would be found to have very desirable consequences in other than strictly religious matters. One of the chief dangers which threatened the Protector was the incessant plots of the royalists, who found support and comfort wherever Cromwell had enemies. So long as he had enemies he could not hope to isolate Charles II. entirely, but his point would be as good as won if he could force the king to throw himself into the arms of the Catholics. The proposed alliance would have accomplished this result. Charles would have been deprived of the support of the Dutch, the active assistance of Brandenburg would cease, and, especially, the support of France and consequently that of the Scotch, would be taken away. Charles II. would be thrown into the arms of the Spaniards and the Irish, of all nations the most hated in England. With the royal cause identified in the minds of the English and Scotch with these intense national animosities, sharpened by religious antipathies, Cromwell could feel himself from this side fairly secure.²

3. The general alliance would have the final advantage of bringing order into the chaos of commercial relations in the North.

Cromwell, with all his religious fervor, did not underestimate the advantages of trade. On the contrary, he regarded it as a producer

observed to them, whereby, and doing them on all occasions other good offices, the opportunity whereof a good intelligence with the crown itself could only give him, he might draw them into a dependence upon himself and make and preserve an interest in France in all events, and do that also which would be most acceptable to England and to all other Protestants in the world, whose cause and interest he professedly asserted, as the head and Protector of them, and he had not a greater consideration than this, in casting his alliance that way and in making war against Spain and the house of Austria, the head and Protector of the Papists." Ib. "Iek ben beducht ten aensien van de rupture met Spanie, dat men sigh hier ten hoogsten sal gelegen laeten wesen om Sweden tegens den Keyser te engageren, ende een Ligue Offensive ende Defensive op te reghten tegens het Huys van Oostenryck, funderende deselve principalyken op het interest van de Religie." Nieupoort to De Witt, October 22, 1655. There was much truth in Cromwell's remark to Schlezer that he had preferred a French to a Spanish alliance from considerations of religion. Schlezer to the Great Elector, December 14, 1655. Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 729.

¹ Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 717.

² Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. The Clarendon State Papers are our chief source of information for the royalist plots.

of the sinews of war.¹ The Navigation Act and the efforts of the Trade and Navigation Committee need only be mentioned in this connection. It was not indifference to these interests, therefore, which caused him to hold aloof from Charles Gustavus' offers of privileges in the Baltic, but the unsatisfactoriness of the offers and the momentous consequences which their acceptance would have involved. Nieupoort was repeatedly assured that the Protector understood perfectly the consequences of the Swedish designs against Prussia. Cromwell's acceptance of Charles Gustavus' proposals would have meant more than Swedish control of the Baltic with all the evil consequences which that involved. It would have brought about just that unfavorable political combination which he tried until the end to prevent. Charles Gustavus would have been called off from his conquest of Poland and his expected invasion of Austria, to turn his arms against Brandenburg, Prussia, and Denmark; and Brandenburg, Denmark, and Holland would have been added to the Protector's already sufficiently long list of enemies. The dangers of such a course were plain, but the benefits not so evident.

It had always been the policy of nations having commercial interests in the Baltic to keep the control of the ports in this region divided, not only on account of the customs duties, but because this was the great source of ship-building supplies, which could not be allowed to fall into the hands of any one power. I can find no evidence to show that the Protector was ever tempted to abandon this policy to secure special trading privileges. Nor, indeed, until, as we shall see, at the very last, when the control of affairs in the North was slipping from his hands, was he willing at any price to allow the extension of Swedish power over the Baltic.² This may perhaps be explained in part by the fact that he appears never to have mastered the details of the complicated affairs in the North, and was, in consequence,

¹ Carlyle, Speech XVIII.

² "Nam Borussiam tanquam granarium Europæ hant tuto Svecorum arbitrio concedi insinuabant." Puf., ii., § 89. "Eoque Regem ad pacem cum Polonis ineundam urgebant, ac ut Borussia decesseret, quam ipsam & Cromwellus, amicissimum se quamvis professus, ipsi invidebat; ac ut alibi emolumentum sunm quereret volebat." Ibid., iv., § 45. "Ick kan wel bemerken, datse gantsch ongaerne souden sien dat Denemarcken of door Tractaet of door Waepenen aen Sweden soude vastgemaect werden." Nicupoort to De Witt, Brieven, iii., 92. "* * * l'on est icy bien aise de le voir puissant et capable de donner de la jalouse à la Maison d'Autriche, mais aussy peut on trouver quelque inconvenient que tout les Ports de la mer Baltique tombent soubz une mesme puissance, et lorsque l'intérêt particulier le permet, les Ministres de cet Estat, sont aussez bons mesnagers." Bordeaux to Brienne, July 17, 1656.

disinclined to break with the traditional policy of all commercial nations having interests there.¹ At any rate, he assured Schlezer that his concern was not so much to secure minor trading privileges, but that the *dominium maris* might be properly divided. If this were maintained, other matters would right themselves.²

But while the Protector could not bring himself to support Charles Gustavus in his effort to unite all the countries about the Baltic into a new kingdom of the North, which would have controlled the tolls and the maritime supplies of the Baltic, neither could he look on idly while the Dutch and Danes destroyed the power of Sweden. His interest lay in maintaining the present balance and in keeping matters in this region quiet. If Sweden could only be brought to direct its arms in the proper channel, namely, against Austria, all this unrest in the North would cease. With the Protestant alliance an accomplished fact, the Dutch need not fear for their commerce, and the Swedes, undeterred by fear of Dutch and Danish forces in their rear, could invade Austria, and, if they chose, extend their conquests in this direction to the Caspian Sea.³

Thus, the whole northern policy of Cromwell may be summed up in one phrase, the general Protestant alliance. All his foreign undertakings, and he had a great many, would be served by it, and could be stated in terms of it. That many motives were involved in it there can be no doubt. I shall not attempt to decide which was the dominant one. Perhaps Cromwell himself hardly knew, for religious and worldly interests were inextricably interwoven in the politics of the 17th century. But we can at least say that it was the religious motive which furnished the key to the solution of the complicated problem. Coming between the religious wars of the first half of the 17th century and the dynastic and commercial wars of the second half, it is not to be wondered at that Cromwell's policy was influenced by each of these

¹ "Er könnte von den Ursachen der Misshelligkeit, die zwischen E. Ch. D. und dem König entstanden wären, nichts beständiges sagen, und es würde ihm nicht zu verdenken sein, wenn er sich so eben nicht würde darin finden können; dann die Oerter wären etwas weit abgelegen; hätte keine eigentliche Gemeinschaft mit diesen Landen; die Interesse, die jura, die privilegia wären etwas verwickelt und hieselbst nicht so gar wohl bekannt." Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 734. Also, Ib., p. 745.

² "Denn der Herr Protector hat die Maxime, dass er sich nicht um die Commerciens so gross, als um das dominium maris (denen jene folgen müssen) bekümmert." Ibid., 737.

³ Kalling, p. 24. The Protector was indeed willing that Charles Gustavus should extend his conquests from Poland south to the Caspian Sea, but he was not willing that he should conquer the territory from Poland north to the Baltic Sea.

interests, and, according to the course of political events, in varying degrees.

Progress of the Negotiations; New Difficulties.—On the 24th of October the treaty with France was brought to a conclusion. On the 2d of November there were signs that the Council was ready to take up the Swedish negotiations, for a committee was appointed to confer with the Protector concerning certain matters communicated by the Swedish ambassador. On the 14th of November a new committee was appointed to take the same matter in hand, and was ordered to meet daily until they had prepared something to offer, and “to report the same with all possible speed.”¹

Yet the negotiations did not make the progress Bonde desired. The Protector’s suspicions had been aroused that the king’s religious pretensions were not entirely sincere. Bonde’s statement to the first commissioners was unfortunate and may have come to the Protector’s ear.² Though Bonde afterwards adopted a different tone, as in his interview with Fleetwood, October 25, and endeavored to give all his proposals a religious color, the Protector was suspicious. It was nothing new, he said to Schlezer, to use religion as a cloak for one’s ambition.³ Nor did Charles Gustavus improve matters by granting religious toleration to the Catholics in Poland, for though Cromwell was exceedingly tolerant towards Protestant sects, his toleration did not extend even in the slightest degree to the adherents of Rome. Bonde had, indeed, a difficult rôle to play, and though it is not clear how he could have proceeded differently, the impression he made was not favorable. It was doubted whether he had sufficient instructions to enter into an alliance such as was desired.

The Protector always preferred playing the part of hammer to that of anvil; consequently, whenever negotiations proceeded unsatis-

¹ S. P. Dom., Interreg., lxxvi., 364 and 374.

² “The Protestant religion had now nothing to fear,” he said to the English commissioners at their first meeting. “The Catholics had made no attack on it except in Savoy, and that was a matter of little importance.” Kalling, p. 17. “As for religion,” Bonde wrote to Charles Gustavus, “it could, to be sure, be made to serve as a basis for a closer alliance, but the mention of it in the treaty should be avoided; for its main purpose is to protect religion and its confessors in case they are attacked by Catholics, but not to try to convert the Catholics or persecute them through a Protestant inquisition; but to allow them free exercise of their rights so long as they do not plot against us, and to seek to influence them through kindness.” Ib., p. 17. I do not know whether this was Charles Gustavus’ opinion also. In response to Cromwell’s letter concerning these massacres, he had sent a protest to the Duke of Savoy, which is now in the archives at Turin (Lettere di principi, Svezia).

³ Schlezer to the Great Elector, January 11, 1656. Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 733.

factorily, or visiting ambassadors tried to avoid the direct issue and to bargain with him, he immediately began to discuss the plan of treating through his own ambassador at the other court. Nieupoort had noticed the Protector's dissatisfaction and had encouraged it. The plan of sending an ambassador to Charles Gustavus in Poland was earnestly debated for some time, but the obstacles seemed insurmountable. Not only did there seem to be no suitable person to send, but the journey to Poland at this time of the year was so toilsome and dangerous, and the communication so difficult, that Thurloe told Nieupoort it might perhaps be better to begin the negotiations with Bonde, trusting that his instructions would prove sufficient.¹

Bonde's impatience had at last grown so demonstrative² that it was necessary to make some show of coming to the point. Accordingly, on December 5, three commissioners were named to carry on the negotiations. They were Whitelocke,³ Strickland, and Fiennes. It was by these that the commercial treaty of July 17 was signed. The matter of a closer alliance was negotiated by Bonde partly with them,

¹ Nieupoort to De Witt, November 19 and 26. Edward Rolt, who had been sent to the king of Sweden with the Protector's ratification of the treaty of Upsala, was now with the king in Poland, begging constantly to be recalled. He received many marks of preference and honor, which of course did not escape the attention of the other ambassadors there, but his mission appears to have had no further significance. No news had been received from him for a number of weeks, which must have convinced the Protector of the futility of sending another ambassador thither. Rolt's instructions and dispatches are printed in volumes iii. and iv. of the Thurloe Papers. The instructions are undated, but I judge from internal evidence that they were written between the 10th and 18th of July, 1655.

² Whitelocke's Memorials, p. 633.

³ Whitelocke was the most favorably inclined towards Sweden of any one of influence in England. His partisanship appeared indeed so marked that he was taken severely to account for it in the Council, and when he attended Bonde's reception of the birth of the young Prince Charles of Sweden, he tells us that the Dutch ambassador treated him coldly. "It was a very great feast of seven courses, the Swedish ambassador was very courteous to me, but the Dutch and others were reserved towards me, and I as much to them." Memorials, p. 634. He was naturally proud of his treaty of Upsala, 1654, and was anxious that something further should come of it. He appears to have formed a friendship with the Swedish chancellor, Erik Oxenstierna, during the latter part of his stay in Sweden. Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, p. 140. Coyet had instructions to visit him with assurances of the king's esteem, and to ask his advice as to the best method of proceeding in the objects of his mission. Instructions, § 9. Bonde sent his secretary with greetings as soon as he had landed at Gravesend, and it was his great desire to have Whitelocke appointed commissioner, which was prevented for some time by the strained relations between Whitelocke and Cromwell, though his knowledge of Swedish affairs and trade was of course very extensive. His name occurs constantly in connection with this embassy, and he is always to a remarkable degree friendly to Sweden. He was also a member of the new Trade and Navigation Committee. His Memorials of the English Affairs contains copious references to the negotiations after the appointment of the new commissioners on December 5, 1655, just at the point where Kalling's narrative breaks off. The references in the following pages to the Memorials are to the folio edition of 1732, or to the marginal pagination of the Oxford edition of 1853.

but principally with the Protector himself. Bonde's diary gives the dates but not the subject-matter of audiences which began to be frequent at this time, and which he tells us were important. Nieupoort also had more frequent audiences, and his letters become more instructive.

Yet if Bonde expected that now finally his mission would make some progress, he was destined to be again disappointed. Another cause of suspicion and delay had arisen, for Charles Gustavus had turned his arms against the Elector of Brandenburg. It is true the initiative had been taken by Brandenburg, but Cromwell could not be expected from the fragmentary reports which reached him to know this. He saw in it an attack on a Protestant prince (though to be sure an unfriendly one), for the purpose of getting control of Prussia. There were ominous signs of his displeasure. His relations with the Dutch ambassador became more cordial and confidential. Bonde explained as best he could, but with little success, and it was even said that when he began as usual to testify to his royal master's devotion to the Protestant cause, the Protector had interrupted him. The project of sending an English ambassador thither was revived, and, naturally, the Dutch encouraged the plan.¹ Whitelocke's name had been mentioned very early, but he appears to have been somewhat distrusted. At last, however, it was decided to send him in company with Christopher Pack, the lord mayor of London.² But Whitelocke objected strenuously, and "endeavoured by all handsome pretences to be excused that service."³ On the 14th of January Nieupoort wrote that the Protector had said, "If the king of Sweden desisted, well and good, but if he continued, he would require something else than ambassadors."⁴

The news that he had desisted was received by the Protector with great pleasure, and in a reply to a letter announcing the birth of the

¹ De Witt to Nieupoort, January 7, 1656.

² He was later the mover of the Petition and Advice.

³ This incident attracted considerable attention at the time. Whitelocke devotes considerable space to it. *Memorials*, 633, *seq.* See also Nieupoort's dispatches and Pufendorff, iii., §76.

⁴ " * * de Heer Protector seyde, * * dat hy albereyts met ernst over de sacken van den Koningh van Polen ende Pruyssen met Bond en Cojet hadt gesprocken, dat hy nogh naeder met haer soude handelen, end byaldien de Koningh van Sweden desisteert, dat het dan wel soude wesen, maer gaet hy voort, dat'er wat anders als Ambassadeurs sal vereyscht worden." Thurloe assured Nieupoort that England and Holland "niet superficielycken maer innerlycken aen den anderen moesten gebonden honden." *Ibid.*

young prince of Sweden he expresses his satisfaction at the treaty of Königsberg in the following terms: "For we make no question but the wresting of the kingdom of Poland by your arms from the Papal Empire, as it were a horn from the head of the Beast, and your peace made with the Duke of Brandenburg, to the great satisfaction of all the pious, though with growls from your adversaries, will be of very great consequence for the peace and profit of the Church. May God grant an end worthy of such worthy beginnings!"¹ This "we look upon here as a very good advantage to the Protestant cause," wrote Thurloe, "hoping that if the Swede can settle his affairs in those parts, he may be a great succour to the Protestants, who are everywhere threatened by the Popish party."²

Both these letters bear traces of the renewed apprehension of Catholic aggression which spread over England at this time.³ The Pope was endeavoring to effect a union of France and Spain, and it was reported that Queen Christina was going to Paris in the interest of it. "The general peace between the Popish party advanceth," wrote Thurloe to General Montague on April 28. "It is probable that a truce may be agreed upon between Spain and France for six years," he wrote on the 13th.⁴ These movements were watched closely by the Protector. They were partly favorable and partly unfavorable to the Swedish designs; for while they made him more zealous in the cause of the Protestant union, he was still less inclined to proceed in it without the Dutch. If a Catholic league were effected, it would as a

¹ Milton, *Literæ*, 110. See Masson, v., 246, *seq.*, whose translation I have used, for a detailed account of this letter; but he seems to me to miss the point of it when he ascribes its laudatory tone merely to a desire to propitiate the king for the delay in Bonde's negotiations. This explanation would rob the passage I have quoted of its significance. As a matter of fact the Protector was in good humor with Charles Gustavus for the moment, and for the reasons given.

² Thurloe to Pell, February 7, 1655-6. *Landsdowne MSS.*, 753, fol. 259. See also *Urk. u. Actenst.*, vii., 735.

³ "Wie ihm aber sei, so wird man alhier je länger je mehr in der Opinion confirmiret, dass aus dem jetzigen Wesen ein rechter generaler und pur lauterer Religionskrieg werden werde." Schlezer to the Great Elector, March 16. *Urk. u. Actenst.*, vii., 741. *Ibid.*, 747.

⁴ *Carte MSS.*, lxxiv., fol. 52 and 54. Also *Puf.*, ii., §91. It was this lack of cordiality and mutual trust that prevented the co-operation of England and France in the North, notwithstanding the similarity of their aims, of which they were fully conscious. " * * * il est d'ailleurs, autant de l'intérêt du Protecteur que de Sa Ma'te que la tranquillité ne soit pas si estable en Allemagne, ny les jaloussies si esteintes, que les Forces de l'Empereur ayant liberté de venir à la solde d'Espagne." Bordeaux to Brienne, May 22. "Je parlay [to Thurloe] des Differens entre le Protecteur et des Provinces-Unies, et souhz les nom des celles-cy, des affaires de Suède, de la jaloussie que ses progrès luy donnaient, et de l'avantage que la France et l'Anglet're re-crevoient si ceste Couronne tournoit ses armes contre le pays de eux qui envoyoient du secours à l'Espagne." *Ib.*, June 26.

matter of course espouse the cause of Charles II. It was impossible to drive the Dutch and Brandenburg to that side also.

The first stage in the realization of the Protector's great foreign policy remained, therefore, now, as before, the pacification of the powers of the North. The Treaty of Königsberg did not bring this about, but it was a long step in that direction. The more difficult task of reconciling Sweden and the Netherlands yet remained. "It is true," wrote Thurloe,¹ "there is some jealousy between him [Charles Gustavus] and the Dutch, and some unkindnesses have passed between them, but my Lord Protector is resolved to use all possible endeavours to unite and reconcile them."¹

Two Proposals for an Alliance.—On January 31, after much impatient chafing on the part of the Swedish ambassador, articles for a treaty on the basis of this policy were submitted to him. But the astonishment with which they were received, betrays at once how much the demands of Charles Gustavus and Cromwell were at variance and how little Bonde had succeeded in fathoming Cromwell's real intentions.² In an interview with Charles Fleetwood, Bonde expressed his indignation without measure,³ though to the English commissioners he appears to have been more reserved. "The ambassador seemed much unsatisfied with divers parts of the articles," says Whitelocke, "and said that he had no commission to treat of any matter concerning the United Provinces to be included, and was much nettled at that business. In discourse touching a general union of the Protestant interests, he said it would be a difficult work; and as for his master's falling upon the emperor, he said that they in Sweden did not wish it to be so, because they doubted that then Sweden would be

¹ In the letter to Pell quoted above.

² Bonde would not have been so taken aback at the nature of these proposals if he had had the privilege of reading Nieupoort's dispatches. As early as September 28, Nieupoort had written: "* * * de Protector seyde, dat het best soude wesen Sweden mede te bewegen tot een gemeene Alliancie met hem, Engelandt, Denemarcken, de Geunieerde Provincien, ende den Keurvorst van Brandenburgh op te reghten, in dewelcke men den anderen soude verseeckeren de vryheyt van de Commerce ende Navigatie." "* * * hy [Cromwell] meende om een vast ende solide werck te maken, dat men Sweden behoorde te inviteren, omme met desen Staet, Denemarcken, de Geunieerde Provincien ende den Heer Keurvorst een naeder defensive Ligue te maken, ende voorts disconrerende, seyde, dat als men die ook offensive soude willen maken, tegens het Huys van Oostenryck, dat Vranckryck daer mede wel toe be te brengen soude wesen." Nieupoort to De Witt, January 14, 1656. One infers from various phrases in Pufendorff that Cromwell had endeavored to make the matter clear, but that Bonde, in his impetuous desire to believe otherwise, did not give the Protector's words due weight.

³ Pufendorff, iii., § 77.

neglected. He declared his opinion to be, not to meddle with the great business of the Protestant Union; nor to have to do with the United Provinces in this or any other treaty; but he said that they might send to the king his master at their pleasure, and have a fitting answer.”¹ Cromwell’s suspicions that Bonde was not authorized to enter into an agreement such as he desired was well founded.

The negotiations were scarcely interrupted by this disagreement. In consequence of the Protector’s proposal to send an ambassador to Charles Gustavus, new instructions had been sent Bonde, which he received on February 8, so that the conferences could be resumed with hardly an interruption, with wider powers and better prospect of success. The favorable outcome of the mission still seemed by no means improbable. There had been from the first two possible ways of coming to an agreement; either Cromwell might be bribed, as it were, to undertake with Sweden the spoliation of the Dutch trade, or Charles Gustavus must allow his arms to be directed against Austria. The first alternative had already proved impracticable. Bonde was instructed not to renew his offers of trading privileges, since the English did not appreciate their value. But it seemed that Charles Gustavus must be driven to accept the second alternative. Affairs in Poland were such that the support of Cromwell seemed indispensable to Sweden. Lisola reported at the close of 1655 that everybody in the king’s following admitted that another war must follow the one then in progress, though there was a difference of opinion as to with whom. Some thought with Austria, some with Russia or the Turk, some with Denmark. If it proved to be with Austria, England and Sweden would have a common cause; if with Russia, England could be of the greatest aid in destroying the port of Archangel and drawing the Russian trade to the Baltic; if with Denmark, the Netherlands must first be overthrown, to which end the support of England was indispensable.²

Nevertheless, Charles Gustavus could not bring himself to make the required concession. He tried in an ingenious manner to avoid the direct issue. But no subterfuge could be ingenious enough to satisfy Cromwell, who was not the man to be either trifled or bargained with.³ The unsuccessful outcome of Bonde’s mission could now be foreseen.

¹ Whitelocke’s *Memorials*, 634.

² Ferdinand Hirsch in Sybel’s *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1x., 478.

³ Gardiner, vii., 194.

“The Swedish ambassador,” says Whitelocke, “received new advices from the king his master, concerning the great business of uniting the Protestant interest; and owned that he had sufficient instructions to conclude upon the general; but that particulars could not so soon be determined, nor so well as upon the place; that it would be a difficult matter to unite the several Protestants who have different interests, and that it would prove a long business: therefore his opinion was, that it was not a seasonable time for a general union of the Protestant interest. But that if the king of Sweden and the Protector made a conjunction first, they might fall upon the emperor and the house of Austria, which would be of great advantage to England, especially now they had war with Spain: and that some supply of money and men afforded to the king upon such a design, would be of more benefit to the Protector than the sending out of great fleets to the Indies, and to the coast of Spain, which would return no benefit to this nation.” But “the opinion of the Swedish ambassador was plainly to be collected, not to admit the Dutch to be joined in a treaty with us.”¹ On February 15, a plan for an alliance, ostensibly on this basis, was presented by Bonde, the details of which are stated so concisely by Whitelocke that I shall quote the passage below.²

The negotiations for the next few weeks turned upon this Swedish proposal. Cromwell, in his desire to keep the peace with Holland and to direct the Swedish arms against Austria, demanded that the alliance be directed expressly against Austria, Poland, and Charles Stuart. Charles Gustavus, however, in spite of what Bonde said to the contrary, wanted to leave the matter of attacking Austria more or less open, to be decided according to the future course of events; but the treaty of alliance must be so worded as to be effective against the Dutch and Danes. Consequently, he demanded that no party should be expressly named, but that it should be made against all their enemies. If Cromwell would not guarantee him his Polish conquests, especially against Denmark and the Netherlands, he wrote on January 20, the alliance would be of little advantage to him.³ Cromwell, on the other hand, demanded that the league should be offensive and

¹ Whitelocke, *Memorials*, 633.

² They are also given by Pufendorff (iii., § 75) under date of January 6, presumably the date of the instructions which Bonde received on February 8.

³ Pufendorff, iii., § 75.

defensive, in order that he might be sure that Charles Gustavus would carry out the agreement. But Charles Gustavus wanted a defensive league only. Cromwell's proposal, he said, would be regarded and accepted by Austria as a declaration of war. Finally, while both Cromwell and Charles Gustavus professed to have no stronger interest than the maintenance of the Protestant cause and the promotion of the Protestant union, they disagreed as to the best method of bringing it about. Cromwell was for immediate union of all the Protestant powers. Bonde dwelt upon the difficulties of such an ambitious plan, and proposed the union of England and Sweden as a beginning, to which other powers could afterwards be drawn in. Even Nieupoort objected to Cromwell's plan as too ambitious,¹ but it seems to me characteristic of its author. All these differences appeared during the whole course of the ensuing negotiations, and both sides held to their views with great persistency.

That the negotiations proceeded so slowly is explained by the Protector's occupation with other matters. The complaint of the slowness with which business was dispatched was general among the ambassadors. It was almost impossible to obtain audience.² Consequently, though Bonde's proposition was made February 15, it was some weeks before he began to realize that they were to be of no avail. But as the prospect for an agreement became more distant and it began to be evident that the king had all and more than he could attend to in Poland, the Protector began to grow cold.³ At this Bonde's wrath knew no bounds. He was endowed with a full share of northern vigor, and expressed himself accordingly. "In his country," he said to Whitelocke, "when a man professed sincerity, they understood it to be plain and clear dealing; that if one were desired to do a thing,

¹ Nieupoort to De Witt, January 14, 1656.

² Schlezer to the Great Elector, April 25, 1656. Bordeaux to Brienne, May 29, 1656.

³ Thurloe sent General Montague (Carte MSS., lxxiiii., fol. 13) a most discouraging account of Charles Gustavus' affairs, "who will meet with many difficulties more to keep his conquests than he had to make them." The Cossacks and Tartars were on the side of Poland, Danzig was disposed to hold out to the last extremity, and a war with the Muscovites appeared very likely. "These things make me think that the Swede is like to have a hot summer of it, especially if we add to what is said before that the States General are sending 48 ships into the Baltic Sea to oppose him also, and are labouring all they can to engage Denmark with them. Some of the 48 ships are already sailed, but yet nothing is pretended by them but fairness, and to have no intention but to preserve their navigation and commerce; but the Swede knows their meaning." There had been rumors of the king's defeat current in England for weeks together, which were readily believed.

if he meant to do it, he would say, yea, and do it accordingly: but if he did not intend to do it, then he would at the first desire to be excused, and not seem at one time to be willing to do it, and at another time to deny it, * * that he should have been contented if he might have had the honour to have laid the foundation of that great business for the glory of God, to unite the Protestant interest; and the particulars thereof to have been left to a new treaty with the king, by an ambassador from the Protector, when there might be full time to consider all grounds and circumstances thereof.”¹

At a conference a few days later Whitelocke was commissioned by the Protector to visit Bonde and assure him of the sincerity of the Protector’s attentions. “According to the direction of his Highness,” he tells us under date of April 7, “I went this morning to the Swedish ambassador, and delivered to him what I was directed from the Protector, as much to his Highness’ advantage as I could improve it; and endeavoured to satisfy the ambassador that his Highness’ intentions and inclinations as to a nearer alliance with the king of Sweden were the same still as at first, and that he had a very good inclination to it, and was really desirous of it.

“The ambassador answered, ‘That perhaps his Highness had no great mind at the first to a nearer alliance with the king of Sweden, and so might have the same intentions still: That he could not but wonder that his Highness should heretofore express himself so well inclined to that nearer alliance, and at his last audience to be so cold in it, and of another opinion than he was before; which would make him seem to his master either negligent as to his service, or not at all thought worthy of regard here; but he desired to know a certain answer, ay or no, whether he would do it or not; and if he had no mind to it, that then there might be a dispatch of what was left to be done upon the treaty made by me, and so he might kiss the Protector’s hand and return to his master.’

“I, seeing him in such a humour of discontent, sought to divert him, and to satisfy him that the Protector was still very well inclined to the point of a nearer alliance with the king of Sweden, but found it difficult to make him of that persuasion; yet thought it fit to demand of him what those propositions were which he delivered to the Protector

¹ Whitelocke’s Memorials, 637.

concerning the nearer alliance. Whereupon the ambassador showed me the propositions he had delivered in to that purpose, which were, 'To have a league defensive *contra omnes gentes*, and offensive as to the maintenance of the treaty of Augsburg; that the Protector should contribute 200,000*l.* *per annum* to that design, when undertaken, and the king should have 30,000 foot and 6,000 horse in service upon it.' I asked why his excellency put the business upon the maintenance of the treaty of Augsburg, whereto England was no party; and why rather it might not be against the house of Austria, whereof the emperor was one branch, and the king of Spain another; and said, 'As to the contributing of money, he knew the Protector was not in a condition at this time to spare money, having such vast occasions of expense at present for maintenance of his navy, and by occasion of the war with Spain.' The ambassador replied, 'That he did believe the Protector was at present in no condition to part with much money, and that there would be some time before this design could be set on foot; by which time probably the Protector might be better able to spare money than now he is; and that he thought it would be better husbandry for England to spare 200,000*l.* a year for this war, which would be a good diversion, and trouble the king of Spain more than we do by spending two millions a year upon our fleets, and in sending to Jamaica. That it was true the treaty of Augsburg was not concerning the English nation, but the Protestants of Germany were highly concerned in it, and consequently all Christendom; and the emperor having broken that treaty in many points, there was a just ground thereby of falling upon him; and the reason why he mentioned the maintenance of that treaty was, because France was already obliged in a treaty with Sweden for the maintenance of the treaty of Augsburg; and England joining likewise therein, France would be engaged with them, and that crown was a good balance. Whereas, if the union with the king of Sweden should be against the house of Austria and the king of Spain, it would cause the peace which was so much endeavoured between France and Spain to be brought to effect; and France would hardly be brought into such an union against the house of Austria, because it would seem too much against the Papists in general, wherein France would be shy to join.' "

This Swedish proposal and its unfavorable reception mark the last

phase of these negotiations which have any interest for us. Though they were continued for some months in a desultory manner, it was more for the purpose of keeping up appearances before the Dutch, than with the expectation of a favorable outcome. The relations between England and Sweden had in fact come to this unsatisfactory stage, that each party sought to involve the other but to avoid committing itself. The fatal objection to the Swedish proposition from the Protector's point of view was that it would have been an agreement by which Sweden might have attacked Austria, but not one by which it must have done so. It would also probably have been construed by the Dutch as a menace, and it contained elements foreign to the matter in hand. The Protector complained that he did not know what might be demanded of him under cover of the treaty of Augsburg. The Swedes, on the other hand, complained that Cromwell was trying to involve them in a war with Austria to further his own interests, only to abandon them to make shift as best they could, when these had been secured. Cromwell had refused to grant the subsidies asked for; indeed he could not. It was seldom that he was not in want of money, but the letters of this date show that it was a time of special embarrassment. He argued, therefore, that as war with Austria was unavoidable for Sweden, the king had an equal interest in it with England and should not demand subsidies;¹ thus showing that Sweden's fear of having to bear the brunt of the struggle was not without foundation.

A Commercial Treaty; Bonde's and Coyet's Departure.—While these fruitless negotiations concerning a nearer alliance and mutual aid had been going on, there had been negotiating, almost independently of them, a treaty of commerce, which was brought to a conclusion on July 17. It had little political significance and consequently lies outside the scope of this paper; yet it may be well to mention some of the matters determined by it.

The plan to transfer the English trade from Archangel to the Baltic,² though pressed hard by Bonde, finally came to nothing. The English merchants feared the Swedish tolls more than the long and perilous journey through the Arctic Ocean and refused to make the change.

The matter of contraband and the closely allied matter of passes were

¹ Pufendorff, iii., § 78, with the marginal date March 7.

² Kalling, p. 20, gives some interesting details.

the subjects of much contention and of some bitter words. The war with Spain was chiefly naval, and the English were determined to cut off the naval supplies of the North from their rivals, and to maintain a strict search in order that they might not be smuggled under false passes. They therefore proposed a list of contraband articles which, Bonde averred, only needed the addition of copper and iron to comprise a complete list of Swedish products. The discussions over this point occupy a large part of the pages which Whitelock gives to these negotiations. Bonde was forced in the end to give way, though his instructions required him to refer the matter to Charles Gustavus for ratification.¹ In the matter of passes the Swedes fared somewhat better.

The request of the Swedes for permission to recruit six or eight thousand Scotch for the king's service was at first refused² until the return of the English fleet from the West Indies, after which the Protector's affairs would be more settled. Permission was afterwards granted, chiefly, it would appear, if not entirely, through Fleetwood's influence. The reports are so confused that I cannot discover how many men were actually raised. The number must have been large, but some of them, at least, did not fulfill what was expected of them.³ The Swedes were not in the least grateful for the favor, but regarded it as serving Cromwell's own interest,⁴ for which view there was at least some color.⁵

As to the trading privileges to be granted the English in return for aid against the Dutch, of which we hear so much during the first part of Bonde's embassy, and so little during the last, I regret that I have not been able to discover exactly what concessions were offered. It seems to me probable that Bonde spoke in general terms merely, and did not descend to particulars. At any rate he made but little impression on the English, and in the new instructions received on Feb-

¹ Coyet's instructions, § 14. This is why it forms a special article of the treaty. Pufendorff gives an abstract of the treaty (iii., § 81), and also publishes the whole text in the appendix. Dumont gives the main part of the treaty, but not the supplementary articles. Tom. vi., part ii., p. 125.

² Rolts' instructions, par. 6. Thurloe Papers, iii., 418. Thurloe told Nieupoort they were refused out of consideration for Dutch feelings.

³ "The levies of England which are sent over hither, signify little. They find not things answer promise or expectation, which makes them mutiny or run away, to the dishonor of our nation." Meadowe to Thurloe, June 29, 1658. Eng. Hist. Review, vii.. 737.

⁴ Pufendorff, ii., § 92.

⁵ Charles II. to Lord Leven. Clarendon S. P., I., fol. 120.

ruary 8 he is told not to press the matter further. There is in the Public Record office an undated paper containing "propositions in order to a treaty with Sweden,"¹ which probably belongs to this period. It asks for lower custom duties and more freedom in the handling and sale of goods. But to English propositions of this kind Bonde objected that "the demands were not equal."² All concessions were, when it came to definite particulars, found to rest after all on strict reciprocity.

Cromwell's letter to Charles Gustavus on Coyet's departure is dated April 17, 1656.³ On May 3, Coyet received the order of Knight of the Garter and a valuable present from Cromwell.⁴ Whitelocke mentions him again under date of May 8,⁵ but he must have sailed soon after.

Bonde was ready to leave in July, but the presents which the Protector intended for him were not ready, so he staid on until September 3.⁶ In his letter of credence, which extols him highly, we read: "As for the transactions that yet remain, we have shortly to send your majesty a special embassy for those, and meanwhile may God preserve your majesty safe, to be a pillar in his Church's defence and in the affairs of Sweden."⁷

The failure of Bonde's mission was generally attributed to Nieuport's influence.⁸ This was certainly the proximate reason, but a deeper reason was perhaps the divergences between the aims of the two rulers, neither of whom was in the habit of making concessions. The doubtful state of Charles Gustavus' fortunes and Cromwell's financial embarrassment also had undoubted influence.⁹

Fleetwood Remains in London.—After the departure of Coyet and Bonde, Swedish interests were left in the hands of Fleetwood, who

¹ S. P., Sweden, 1656.

² Whitelocke's Memorials, 635.

³ Milton, Literæ, 117.

⁴ Whitelocke's Memorials, 644.

⁵ Ibid., 645.

⁶ " * * * l'Ambas'r s'est retiré après avoir receu becoup de marques extraordinaires." Bordeaux to Brienne, September 11.

⁷ Milton, Literæ, 125.

⁸ "Der jetzt à tout force regieret." Schlezer to Waldeck, June 6, 1656.

⁹ "Ceux qui croient cognostre l'estat des affaires Domestiques du Protecteur, jugent que ce n'est pas le temps de prendre aucune délibération sur celles de dehors, et moins encore de s'engager dans une Alliance qui renouvelle la guerre avec les Provinces-Unies." Bordeaux to Brienne, August 23, 1656.

kept his character of ambassador secret in order to frequent the court with greater freedom. So easily could he do this under cover of his family connections that it was not till December that Nieupoort discovered his real object.¹ There appears to have been no special negotiations for some time, although the Protector had not abandoned the plan of a closer alliance. On June 29, before Bonde's departure, the Council voted "that his Highness be reminded of speeding an ambassador into Sweden,"² and although the Protector's relations with the Dutch were already less cordial,³ the mediation of a peace between Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands was still the keystone of his policy in the North.⁴ On August 21 he wrote to the States General earnestly deprecating the disagreement between the United Provinces and Sweden, and urging the necessity of union amongst Protestant states in opposition to Spain.⁵ During this same month he wrote to the king of Sweden, and on December 4 to the king of Denmark⁶ in much the same strain. But on December 1 Nieupoort wrote that he heard no more of sending an ambassador to Sweden. The calling of Parliament, the war with Spain, attempts to raise money, royalists and assassination plots, and the Petition and Advice were sufficient to keep the Protector occupied until well into the following year. Even as late as July 29, 1657, Nieupoort thought domestic matters occupied the Protector's attention more than foreign affairs.

Bremen.—But, in the meantime,⁷ there had been important though fruitless negotiations going on that Nieupoort knew nothing of. Ever since the beginning of the Polish war, the king of Denmark had been waiting for a favorable opportunity to strike back at his old antagonist. As the position of Sweden became more difficult in the spring of 1657, the attitude of Denmark grew more threatening, and it was evident

¹ Nieupoort to De Witt, December 1, 1656.

² S. P. Dom., Interreg., lxxvii., fol. 190.

³ "I like not the carriage of the Hollanders; our ships of war and theirs scarce ever meet in the Channel but they have some scuffle or other." Thurloe to Montague, August 28, 1656. *Carte MSS.*, lxxiii., fol. 26.

⁴ "Les affaires de Suède et de Pologne le touehent darvantage, et il songe encore à une Union estroite avec eeste Couronne, la France, le Dannemark, et les Estatz-Genéraux, eomme à un moyon asseuré de balancer la puissance de la Maison d'Autriehe." Bordeaux to Brienne, November 27, 1656. Also Bordeaux to Mazarin, December 4, 1656.

⁵ Milton, *Literæ*, 130, and Thurloe, v., 330, from which the date is taken. The reply of the Dutch is annexed, dated September 22.

⁶ Milton, *Literæ*, 154, but without the day of the month. The original in the Danish archives is dated December 4, 1656 (Maeray).

⁷ Pufendorff gives the marginal date as February 13, for the following negotiations.

that a rupture might soon be expected. Charles Gustavus was suffering chiefly from a lack of money, and turned again to Cromwell for aid, asking the loan of £100,000. Cromwell expressed his willingness to furnish the money on a sufficient guarantee of repayment, namely, the possession of the Bishopric Bremen. Bremen was worth so much more than the amount of the proposed loan that the king at first regarded this counter-demand as merely a means of parrying his request. Yet this was not the case. Cromwell made the proposal in all earnestness, and clung to it with great persistency. It was, in fact, too much in keeping with his procedure elsewhere for us to doubt his sincerity in it. He always had a hankering after ports and strong places on the Continent, and we have only to take his motives in other cases and apply them to the state of affairs in the North to find his motives here.

We have already seen how Cromwell's policy in the North required that affairs in that region should not be disturbed. Considerations of trade demanded that the control of the Baltic remain divided as it then was; the interests of religion demanded that the two northern Protestant powers direct their arms against the common Catholic enemy, not against each other. In trying to secure a foothold in Bremen, Cromwell must have had a very definite object. It was directed against some one in particular, and who could this be but those who were conspiring against the existing peace in the North, a peace upon which his northern policy, and with it his whole foreign policy, rested? As the possession of Dunkirk and Mardyke was desired not merely as an inroad against the Spanish power, but as a means of bringing pressure to bear on France and the Netherlands,¹ so the possession of Bremen must have been designed, in part, if not chiefly, to the same end with regard to Denmark. This view is supported by the fact that the Protector was at the same time on the point of sending an ambassador, Mr. Meadowe, to Denmark to persuade Frederick to refrain from his attack on Sweden.² His efforts would have much greater prospect of success if they

¹ See Thurloe, *Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time*, or in lieu of this, *Concerning Forraigne Affaires in the Protector's Time*, Lord Somer's Tracts, vi., 331, for a very lucid and concise explanation of the Protector's objects in Flanders.

² On February 24, 1657, the Council voted that the Protector be recommended to send Meadowe to Denmark, and following entries in the Council Order Book show that his immediate departure was intended; but he was held back, for reasons which are not stated, until September 3, the day of Jephson's departure.

could be supported by the presence of an English force on the Danish frontier.

But of course, as usual, Cromwell may have had more than one object. The German Protestants would be encouraged by the presence of an English force, and this influence in Germany could be used in various ways, among others, it may be, to the advantage of English trade.¹ "Being now on the continent, and considered as the patron of the Protestant interest, he stood fair for the undertaking and prosecuting any design, to which the vicissitude of human affairs might give him opportunity."² Finally, he was justified in demanding a secure military base of operations for so distant an undertaking.³ In short, it seems that we may accept Cromwell's own explanation of his chief objects, when he told Charles Gustavus that English possession of Bremen would keep the Dutch and Danes quiet and encourage the Protestants, while the king would be free to make better use of its garrisons elsewhere.⁴

But the reason why Cromwell wanted Bremen was the very reason why Charles Gustavus could not surrender it. He, too, wanted a commanding position over Denmark, but for a different reason. Cromwell had every interest in preserving peace. Charles Gustavus wanted war. He was tired of his Polish adventures, with their unsubstantial gains but very substantial ills. Denmark offered a field for something more than barren victories; to surrender Bremen on the eve of the struggle was not to be thought of.⁵ He, therefore, urged various excuses,

¹ One infers this latter more from the prevailing commercial ideas of the time and Cromwell's constant efforts to extend English trade, than from any definite evidence which our sources offer. It may be urged against this view, that the English occupation of Bremen was intended to be only temporary (Jephson's instructions, par. 8) unless, indeed, it can be shown that Cromwell thought the Swedes would not be in a position to redeem it. Yet the position of Bremen, controlling alike the Elbe and the Weser, was exceedingly favorable to such plans.

² Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time, referring to the possession of Dunkirk, etc.

³ Jephson's instructions, par. 6. Thurloe Papers, vi., 478.

⁴ "Addebatur rationes: eam nimium a Svecia remotam; ac posse Regem milite praesidiario alibi uti: idque Belgarum destinata valde turbaturum, Danique scruplum injecturum metu irruptionis in Jutiam: denique praesentia Anglorum Protestantibus animos additum iri ad Pontificis eo acris resistendum." Pufendorff, iv., § 79.

⁵ The importance of the Swedish possession of Bremen as an opening into Denmark was well understood at that time. "By which the Swede * * * bas betwixt his ancient patrimony on the one side, and his new acquisitions on the other, as it were enclosed and beleaguered Denmark." Meadowe's Narrative, p. 2. "* * * het Stift Bremen, het welche soo is gelegen, dat het seer considerable is voor den Koningh van Denemarcken, die daer door, ende door het geene hy was genoocksaet gewest aan Sweden te rnymen door het gemelde Tractaet, als tusschen den haemer ende het aenbeeldt was gcklemt geweest." Nieupoort to De Witt, July 29, 1657. The significance of Charles Gustavus' marriage with the daughter of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp must not be forgotten in this connection.

among others the real one, and was inclined for a time not to press the matter further.

Yet since Cromwell appeared bent on getting a footing in Germany, it might be possible to come to an agreement with him at the expense of someone else. Would he not take forcible possession of Emden and East Friesland, or Oldenburg; or, if he considered this too difficult, would he not be content with building a fort on the River Stör, and taking possession of the surrounding country? He would then have no need of Bremen, which on account of its supplies of money and of troops, and its nearness to Denmark, the king could ill spare. It is not surprising that these proposals made no impression on the Protector. It was one thing to take peaceful possession of a province for furthering a definite object. It was quite another thing to turn freebooter and begin a war of wanton aggression against powers, with one at least of whom he was on terms of close friendship.¹ The propositions were therefore declined.

Meadow's and Jephson's Mediation.—The relations between England and Sweden became more distant for a time,² yet events soon tended to draw them together again. In spite of the constitutional struggles in which Cromwell was involved, he found time to come to an agreement with Mazarin for the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands. Three days later the emperor of Germany died, opening a new opportunity for hostile action against the house of Hapsburg. Both Cromwell and Charles Gustavus were extremely interested in bringing the imperial crown into other hands,³ and were prepared to second France in its efforts to accomplish this end, although it must be confessed that neither of them was in a position to make his influence very much felt in the matter. But the deciding factor in uniting

¹ Various passages in Masson give us glimpses of Cromwell's relations with the Count of Oldenburg. As early as the middle of 1651, before the battle of Worcester, we find an envoy from the latter in London for the purpose of establishing a good understanding with the Commonwealth. Their relations were throughout most cordial, and in 1654 Count Frederick's son, Count Antony, visited England. It was with a team of spirited horses sent as a present from the count that the well known runaway incident in Hyde Park occurred.

² *Bedenken des Schwedischen Senats über die Frage: Ob sich König Carl Gustav in Schwerden mit Frankreich und Engelland in ein Bündniß wider das Haus Oesterreich einlassen solle? de anno 1657.* Lünig, *Staats-Concilia*, ii., 593. The Council thought it better to await the development of the plans of Austria.

³ Lünig, *Staats-Concilia*, ii., 592. Carlson, iv., 192, Anm. Urk. u. Actenst, vii., 766. Both suggested the Elector of Brandenburg as a possible candidate. There is an anonymous manuscript in the British Museum (Add. 32093, fol. 397) advocating England's interference, chiefly on religious grounds.

Cromwell and Charles Gustavus was the outbreak of the Danish war, closely followed by the formation of a new alliance between Poland and Austria. Cromwell informed Charles Gustavus that if the Dutch appeared to be supporting the Danes in this matter he would take other counsels,¹ and he pressed again for possession of Bremen. The Danes would hardly have ventured in their present course, he said, if his former proposals had been accepted. He even reduced his demand to the possession of Stade as a basis for military operations; but even this Charles Gustavus was unwilling to grant. The king could only bring himself to offer the strongholds of the Dutchy Verden, although he might have foreseen that the possession of inland forts with no possibility of relieving them by sea in case of siege,² would be the last proposal that Cromwell would accept. The negotiations had in fact again degenerated into mere bargaining, and as usual Cromwell determined to treat through his own envoys. Philip Meadowe had long been intended as ambassador to Denmark, and now Maj.-Gen. Wm. Jephson was named for a similar mission to the king of Sweden.

The objects of Meadowe's mission are given in a paper entitled: "Propositio legati protectoris Angliae ad regem Daniae," which was recently discovered by Dr. Joseph Weiss, and published in *Historisches Jahrbuch* (vol. xiv., p. 608). Meadowe has incorporated the contents of this paper into his Narrative in the following words: "England had too great an interest in the Baltic (the Mediterranean of the North) to sit still without making reflection upon those commotions in the northern kingdoms. For besides the general concerns of a free trade, which must of necessity have suffered interruption by the continuance of this war, England being at that time engaged in a war with one branch of the Austrian family, viz., with Spain, would rather the Swedish arms had been at liberty to give check to the other branch in Germany as occasion might offer, than to be diverted therefrom by a war with Denmark. * * * His [Meadowe's] business was to remonstrate how unwelcome it was to them in England to understand of a rupture betwixt the two crowns, albeit they esteemed the communication thereof by the letters and manifest³ of that king as an expression of friendship. That besides the effusion of Christian

¹ Puf., iv., § 79. Urk. u. Actenst, vii., 762.

² Jephson's instructions, par. 9.

³ *Jus feciale armatae Daniæ.*

blood betwixt two nations linked together by the common bonds of nature and religion, and both of them leagued in amity with England, the continuation of that war might in so perilous a juncture considerably endanger the whole Protestant cause and interest; and nothing could have happened more advantageous to Spain, with whom England was in open hostility. Besides, his majesty of Denmark could not but be sensible how much the freedom of navigation and commerce in the Baltic would be impeached thereby, to the prejudice of the neighboring nations, but of none more than England, as continually fetching naval stores from those countries. He was therefore sent on the part of England to that king to offer the best and most friendly offices for the accommodating all differences betwixt the two crowns, and putting a stop to so unhappy a war, and to assure him that they would employ their utmost interest with the king of Sweden to dispose him thereto, and to that purpose had already sent a gentleman to him."¹ From subsequent negotiations, it appears that Cromwell intended to make the treaty of Bromsebro the basis of the new peace.

Jephson's secret instructions² are dated August 22, 1657. They recite that the former negotiations with Bonde had come to nothing because Bonde was not authorized to agree upon "the terms of that assistance" which had been asked for, nor to place at the Protector's disposal any "places of safe retreat for his men, or secure harbours for his ships." "Furthermore, this assistance being desired by the king, and wholly upon the account of his interest, the expense and charge of such an undertaking is to be considered, if not in present, yet hereafter, when it shall please God to put his majesty's affairs into a more peaceable condition." If, now, his majesty is willing to place Bremen at the Protector's disposal for this purpose, the Protector will send forces to take possession of it, and will agree to surrender it again "at any time upon demand of the crown of Sweden, being first paid the charges we shall be at over and above what shall be levied upon the country, in and about the keeping and securing the said dukedom." These instructions have on the face of them a somewhat different as-

¹ Meadowe's Narrative, p. 16, *seq.*

² Printed in Thurloe Papers, vi., 478. The original manuscript, in the handwriting of Thurloe, with many erasures and corrections, evidently the first draft, is in the British Museum. Add. MSS. 4157, fol. 201.

pect than the foregoing, but in reality they are quite in keeping with it. For if the king had acceded to this demand, Cromwell would have been master of the situation, and could have mediated, as it were with sword in hand, and with some prospect of success. Yet he appears to have been not very confident that the proposal would be accepted, for Jephson was told not to mention the matter "unless his majesty should administer the occasion thereof, and express himself inclined to put it into our hands."

After some difficulty in ascertaining the whereabouts of the two kings, Meadowe and Jephson were received at Copenhagen and Wismar respectively with special marks of honor, and both kings signified their readiness to accept the Protector's mediation. But in the course of the proposals and counter-proposals which were exchanged during the succeeding months,¹ it soon became evident that neither party was willing to make the necessary concessions. Certain details could not be adjusted, because certain vital matters of policy were involved in them. The place of meeting for the commissioners presented the first difficulty. The king of Denmark proposed Lübeck as a convenient and neutral place, trusting to have the presence and support of his Polish and Austrian allies. The king of Sweden proposed some place on the inaccessible frontier of Denmark and Sweden, according to ancient custom and the treaty of Bromsebro, in order that the ambassadors of the allies of Denmark could not with any convenience attend, and he might thus sow jealousy and dissension among his enemies through a separate treaty. From this arose another dispute. The mediation had been offered between Sweden and Denmark alone, but in his declaration of November 3 the king of Denmark demanded that Poland and Brandenburg be included. Much anxiety was caused in English councils by this new demand and Denmark's cause was prejudiced not a little by it; but Denmark appeared bound by treaty not to make a separate peace. Charles Gustavus was willing to grant the ambassadors of the allies licenses to be present as spectators, but not as confederates and principals, and on this point no agreement could be reached. To these came a third difficulty. Charles Gustavus had proposed that the good officers of France be joined with those of England in the

¹ Meadowe's account of these, *Narrative*, p. 19, *seq.*, is very concise and clear. See, also, Meadowe's and Jephson's dispatches in *Thurloe Papers*, *Pufendorff*, iv., § 77, *Diarium Europaeum*, etc.

mediation. Denmark proposed in return the inclusion of the States General also. This Charles Gustavus would admit on one condition, that they first ratify the treaty of Elbing. But Denmark insisted that they be included without waiting for the ratification. So bitter was the feeling on this point that when Dutch ambassadors arrived at the court of Charles Gustavus he at first refused them audience, hoping, as Jephson thought, to drive the Dutch to espouse openly the cause of the Danes, which would force the Protector against his will to the side of Sweden. In short, the attempt at mediation failed utterly, because neither party desired it. Neither the king of Sweden was deterred by the formidable combination of his enemies, nor the king of Denmark by the loss of Jutland, and each hoped for a favorable turn of fortune. "Mediating princes are most welcome and successful when the parties are wearied with the war, as those physicians are most happy who come in the declension of a disease."¹

Friesendorff's Instructions.—At about the time of Meadowe's and Jephson's departure, a Swedish ambassador, J. F. von Friesendorff, arrived in England with instructions of a remarkable character, which for disregard of the accepted rules of political morality can hardly be matched among the papers of the time. They reveal a characteristic trait of the foreign policy of this prince, who, with all his attractive personal qualities, cannot be acquitted of violence and lawlessness in his relations with his neighbors.

If Cromwell's hesitancy in engaging in the northern war could be overcome by offers of territorial acquisition on the Baltic, then surely there need be no difficulty. Friesendorff's secret instructions² contained an elaborate system of proposals and alternatives for the English occupation of various portions of German and Danish territory in order to induce Cromwell to finally lend efficient aid to Swedish

¹ Meadowe, *A View of the Suedish and other Affairs*, p. 175.

² They have been printed by Treschow in *Nye Danske Magazin*, Tredje Bind (1810), p. 73, from a copy in the Danish archives. Pufendorff gives a fairly complete abstract of them (ib. iv. § 82). "In irgend einer Weise fiel den Dänen die Instruction in die Hände, und diese beeilten sich, sie in Berlin mitzutheilen; der Kurfürst wiederum theilte sie, während der Friedensverhandlungen in Oliva, dem kaiserlichen Hofe mit (dat. 23. März 1660); so dass also diese schwedisch-englischen Geheimnisse sehr bald in weiten Kreisen bekannt waren. Übrigens kursirten Gerüchte über solche schwedisch-englische Abmachungen schon in September 1656 auf dem Reichsdeputationstag in Frankfurt; s. Urk. u. Actenst., vii., 677." Erdmannsdorffer, *Deutsche Geschichte*, i., 285, Anm. 2. "Le diet Sr. Secrétaire d'Estat commença par me désavouer que les Ministres de Suède cussent fait aucunes offres, soit de Glowstadt ou d'aucune autre Place." Bordeaux to Mazarin, March 5, 1658.

arms. The proposals were as follows: For the first part, Cromwell should unite his forces with those of Sweden against Denmark until the latter had been brought to a position in which it was no longer to be feared "and the freedom of commerce and free passage through the Sound was restored to all nations." In order that the balance of power in the Sound might be maintained, it was proposed that Sweden resume possession of its ancient provinces, Schonen, Blecking, and Halland, together with Christina and the provinces Bohus and Druntheim as protection against Danish invasion,¹ and finally that the County Pinneberg, and the Kremper and Wilster Marches, which had formerly belonged to Bremen, should be restored to it.

As soon, now, as they had without difficulty set their house in order (for surely Cromwell, too, had as much to fear from Denmark and Holland as from Spain and Austria), Charles Gustavus proposed to accede to Cromwell's long-cherished desire for a common attack against the house of Hapsburg, and in addition to make certain other concessions which would serve not only the public interests of England, but Cromwell's private interests as well. First, the king agreed to assist in the conquest of Delmenhorst and Oldenburg (his claims to the former he abandoned in Cromwell's favor), which Cromwell should "hold as his own"; and that Cromwell should be free to take possession of East Friesland, the Bishopric Munster, and as much of the Westphalian Circle as he was able to, as quarter for his troops, which advantage Charles Gustavus proposed to share also with the greater part of his army. The possession of these provinces would lend Cromwell a support in his private ambition in establishing the power of his house such as England did not offer, and would give him the opportunity of attacking at his pleasure either the Danes, the Dutch, or the house of Hapsburg. Various pretexts for the proposed violence were suggested, as well as methods for satisfying the injured princes. If, however, this was not sufficient, and Cromwell desired a position by which he could bring Poland and Danzig to account for past injuries, and in conjunction with Sweden, attack Austria from the side of Silesia,² the fortification Weichselmünde near Danzig could be given

¹ Bohus and Druntheim were then being used by the Danes as bases for military operations against Sweden.

² Droysen's statement (*Geschichte d. Preussische Politik*, iii., 2, 250, 2d ed.), that Silesia was offered to Cromwell by Charles Gustavus, probably rests upon a misunderstanding of this phrase. Erdmannsdörffer, *Deutsche Geschichte*, i., 285, Anm. 1.

him, together with a part of Pommerellen. Charles Gustavus would also assist in the taking of Putzke.

All these advantages were offered the Protector in order to grant him a foothold in Germany and to persuade him to engage in the common struggle. Yet Charles Gustavus would prefer if instead of this he would take part in the conquest and partition of Denmark. In this case his share would be North Jutland, with the port Listerdiep and the neighboring islands, which would be more advantageous in supporting the English fleet than the proposed parts of Germany. From this, however, the king excepted the districts Koldingen and Horsens, or in lieu of the latter, Ripen, which, with the remainder of Jutland, and Schleswig, Holstein, and Fünen, would be given to his father-in-law, the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, under Swedish and English guarantee. The three districts, Pinneburg, Wilster, and Kremper were, however, to be detached from Holstein and reunited with Bremen. As for the rest of the Danish dominions, they were to be at the absolute disposal of Charles Gustavus, to be granted to whatever person he chose, or to be divided into small portions "as might best serve the common interest."

The list of alternatives was, however, not yet exhausted. If Cromwell demanded Ditmarch, with Kremper, Wilster, and the islands about Listerdiep instead of Oldenberg and Delmenhorst, this, too, could be allowed him, together with Glückstadt; but in this case he must resign his plans on the Weser. Yet, finally, if it appeared that the only means to engage his assistance was to give him a foothold on both the Elbe and Weser, Friesendorff was authorized to grant this also; but the king depended upon his dexterity to avoid such extreme concessions unless they proved unavoidable.

It was realized that such proposals were of a nature to awaken grave suspicions on Cromwell's part, and Friesendorff was therefore instructed to emphasize the fact that Charles Gustavus did not intend to assume the crown of Denmark himself, but only to transfer it to some friend, as the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. In addition, the English would secure free passage through the Sound and certain privileges over all other foreigners in the lands and ports belonging to Sweden. Finally, Charles Gustavus was prepared to surrender his claims to Prussia in favor of some Protestant prince, as the elector of Bran-

denburg, although in this case it was only just that a compensation be given Charles Gustavus for his sacrifices in the Polish war. The equivalent proposed was the recognition on the part of Poland of Swedish sovereignty over Lieffland and Courland and the payment of a large sum of money, and the cession on Brandenburg's part of Hinterpomerania, with something more.¹

If, however, the Protector could not be moved by any means to take part in the conquest and partition of Denmark, Friesendorff must fall back on the old proposition of an alliance against Austria. If this were refused, the king would be forced to come to terms with them and the Dutch, to the detriment of Protestant interests in all parts of the world. At the very least, the Protector must take it upon him to hold the Dutch in check, and to this purpose send a fleet into the Baltic in case they made any signs of espousing the cause of Denmark. But yet, if the relations of England and Holland were such that there was no prospect of this, Holland could, "for the sake of the common interest of the Protestant religion," be tolerated in the general alliance which paragraph 11 of Friesendorff's instructions authorized him to propose.

Friesendorff's first efforts were to be directed against Denmark, and in order to further this, secondly, against Austria. Paragraph 11 of the instructions contains the details of a proposed alliance between Sweden, England, France, and Portugal, also Holland it might be, against the house of Hapsburg and its allies. To prevent confusion and disputes, a council of the members of the alliance would be formed to decide upon matters which should arise. Each member must furnish his appropriate quota of ships, which, however, were to be placed under a single command, Cromwell being encouraged to believe that he would be chosen. If France and Portugal desired it, the operations on land could be continued as they then were, England to take position in Germany as proposed, and Sweden to act as a reserve, to be supported with subsidies in case its forces were brought into action. Finally, the proposed league must devise and execute means for depriving the house of Hapsburg of the imperial crown.

Friesendorff was ordered to sound the Protector privately before

¹ He had already broached this to the Elector of Brandenburg. Carlson, iv., 242 and 244, Anm. 2.

making his mission publicly known, and if he found the Protector unfavorably inclined, to pretend that he was on his way to Portugal, and had only been accidentally delayed in England. This he should do until the development of affairs made further "dissimulation" unnecessary. The instructions were dated at Wedell on the Elbe, August 3, 1657.

I regret that I have not been able to discover exactly how Cromwell received these proposals. There were some parts of them well calculated to enlist his support. If only the matter with Denmark could be patched up and the Dutch pacified, the great Protestant alliance would seem to be on the point of being realized. It might be possible to reconcile Charles Gustavus' proposals with those for an alliance between England, Holland, and France, which the Dutch were then pressing. There is no evidence, however, that I can find, that he ever seriously entertained Charles Gustavus' proposals for dividing Germany and Denmark. That these proposals did not coincide in the least with his northern policy in general is, I think, sufficiently clear. What would have become of the Protestant alliance? What would the Dutch have had to say, and what assistance might they not have given Charles II.? Besides, subsequent events showed that Cromwell had no desire to reduce Denmark to a "position in which it need no longer be feared." The proposals, in short, quite apart from all moral considerations, would have involved a radical change in England's foreign relations such as a clear-sighted statesman like Cromwell would not lightly undertake. There is a tendency among historians who have touched upon this episode to link Cromwell's name with that of Charles Gustavus in the tacit reproach with which it must be regarded; but until it has been shown that Cromwell actually entertained the plan for a time, this would seem to be an injustice to him.

*Course of the Negotiations.*¹—The course of the ensuing negotiations

¹ Pufendorff, iv., §§ 84 and 85. The documents for the succeeding pages are so scanty that it is difficult even to keep up the appearance of a connected narrative. We have mere fragments, which we can sometimes piece together, sometimes not. From English sources alone one would hardly know of the existence of Friesendorff; for in the few cases in which his name is mentioned, it is usually misspelled. There is nothing corresponding to Bonde's diary to give one a thread, however slight, to string fragments together upon. Whitelocke gives us no information. The dispatches of the foreign ambassadors, even of Nieupoort, are of little aid. Even Pufendorff, who is often our only guide, seems to me less lucid. He evidently bases his narrative on the letters of the Swedish ambassadors, who appear to have worked largely in the dark. An examination of the Swedish archives would no doubt bring new material to light, but as is the case with so many of Cromwell's foreign enterprises, it is probable that much will never be known.

was not such as the Swedish ambassadors desired. Cromwell showed Fleetwood and Friesendorff every attention and, as usual, asked for a few days for deliberation. Then followed those delays and excuses which characterized all Cromwell's negotiations, and which ambassadors at his court continually complained of. The Swedish ambassadors found it impossible to discover the Protector's real motives. Though English sympathy had been at first decidedly against Denmark as the aggressive party, they found this to a certain extent changed. Charles Gustavus' military successes had in fact prejudiced his diplomatic prospects. Following their instructions, the ambassadors proposed an offensive and defensive league against Austria, Spain, Poland, and Denmark and whoever might join them, in which Cromwell was asked to send a fleet into the Baltic, to continue his efforts in Flanders, to contribute subsidies, and in the meantime, before all the details could be agreed upon, to send immediate relief to Gothenburg, which was blockaded by a small Danish fleet. Cromwell complained that this was asking too much of him, but, as usual, promised to consider the matter. He appears to have had definite reasons for hesitating,¹ but what they were, unless it was waiting for the result of Meadowe's and Jephson's mission, or inability to find a clear thread in the tangled skein, is not clear. In order to whet his lagging enthusiasm, Charles Gustavus sent another proposal. In return for £200,000,² he was ready to surrender Buxtenhude and the fort on the Leher as security. What reception this proposal met with I cannot discover.

For a long time the relations between England and the Netherlands had been growing less satisfactory. The "marine treaty," the object of unremitting efforts on the part of the Dutch since the close of the war in 1654, had not yet been brought to a conclusion, much to Nieuport's chagrin. On the other hand, not only did England suspect the Netherlands of having instigated Denmark's hostility, but had grounds for believing that the Dutch equipments then in progress were intended to act in conjunction with Spanish forces against Portugal. The Protector did not conceal these suspicions.

De Witt adopted a policy similar to the one which had succeeded so

¹ Jephson to Thurloe. Thurloe Papers, vi., 604 and 629.

² Carlson says £400,000, iv., 242.

well a few months before. He suggested a defensive treaty, this time not between England, the United Provinces and Denmark, but between England, the United Provinces and France.¹ The idea was welcomed by the Protector, though not quite so warmly as the former one had been. It had some promise of the great alliance in it, which the Protector had by no means yet abandoned. Still, the relations between the two powers were somewhat strained, and Nieupoort did not for the time being share the Protector's full confidence.

About the beginning of October, it seemed as if Cromwell, moved by the critical condition of Swedish affairs, had decided that some show of armed interference was necessary. Under date of October 9,² Fleetwood and Friesendorff inform the king "in hochster eyl," that through the grace of God and their unflagging industry they had at last brought the Protector to a certain resolution. He had decided to come to the king's assistance and to form a close alliance with him against Austria and its allies (for reasons of state, and to appease the prejudices of the English people, he must call the child by that name), and commissioners would be appointed to confer with the Swedish ambassadors concerning the matter. He desired only a week's delay to equip a fleet and to put his affairs in order; an envoy would be sent to Holland to warn the Dutch against the course they were pursuing. He had not taken this course before from lack of money; but he thought he now had good prospects of removing this difficulty.

Already, on October 3, Cromwell had issued a warrant for the equipment of a fleet. It was to consist of twenty ships, to be ready in fourteen days at farthest, and to be furnished with at least three months' provisions.³ "The design for the ships," wrote Thurloe,⁴ "is to give countenance to Sweden, whose affairs are in a dangerous condition, being left alone in the midst of very many powerful enemies, [the] Pole, the king of Hungary and [the] Muscovite and the Dane, and fears also the Hollander, who gives money and if need be will send

¹ Nieupoort's and De Witt's letters of May 4 and following, though without the authority of the States General. It was as first a suggestion merely, not a formal proposal.

² The letter is printed in *Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens Historia*, v., 205-213.

³ Carte MSS., lxxiii., fol. 132. The names of the vessels, their rates and the number of seamen are given, aggregating 816 guns and 4,020 men.

⁴ Carte MSS., lxxiii., fol. 138. Thurloe to Montague, October 9, 1657. Holograph, chiefly in cipher, imperfectly deciphered, and hard to read. It is printed, with some changes, in Thurloe Papers, vi., 582, under the heading, "Draught of a letter concerning Swedish affairs, to General Montague."

the Dane the ships [eighteen in number] which were appointed to lie upon the Dogger Bank. The ministers of Sweden are of opinion that if ships [were] sent that way to wait upon the motions of [the] Hollanders, though no act of enmity past, it would keep the Hollander from him. And for this purpose and no other are these ships prepared. * * * This is under absolute secrecy and is not to be communicated to any."

The tone of this letter contrasts strangely with the boyish precipitation of Fleetwood and Friesendorff's letter to Charles Gustavus, while their contents would hardly allow us to believe that they referred to the same matter. But the cautious and diplomatic Thurloe is a safe guide in matters of this sort (Cromwell in his enthusiasm often said too much) and it is probable that there was not very much behind this incident which raised Swedish hopes so high. At any rate, when the Dutch did not send their fleet into the Sound, the English refrained from further demonstration. It must not be forgotten that Cromwell was actuated at this time by other considerations than relations in the North. His struggle against Spain and the house of Hapsburg was still the chief point of his foreign relations,¹ and his whole aim in the North was to bring affairs in this part in accord with this great issue. It is significant, therefore, that the only remonstrance which was made to Nieupoort in connection with this incident was against Holland's negotiation with Spain and its hostility towards Portugal.² The affairs of Sweden were not mentioned. When the Dutch did not send their fleet to the Baltic, as was expected, but called it quietly home, the Protector on his part was willing to let the matter drop. To have acted otherwise would have transferred the center of his foreign policy from Spain to the North.

But the Protector had expressed himself so unreservedly to Fleetwood and Friesendorff that he felt it necessary to propose terms for a treaty, although he did so only after what seemed to the Swedes an inexcusably long delay, and in terms very different from those they thought themselves justified in expecting. He proposed an offensive and defensive alliance against "the kings of Spain, Hungary, and Poland

¹ "The Protector in all these cases governs himself by the Protestant cause," wrote Thurloe on October 2, "and he thinks a peace between the two northern crowns is best for that, if it may be had." Thurloe Papers, vi., 547.

² Nieupoort to De Witt, November 12.

and the house of Austria," which France, the Netherlands, and others were to be invited to join. The king of Sweden must make an attack on Austria, strengthened by troops furnished by the allies, but maintained at his own expense. The Protector would wage war at sea against Spain, to which purpose the king must agree to furnish naval material in such quantities and at such rates as might be agreed upon in the articles of the treaty. Cromwell bound himself to send a fleet into the Baltic if it were necessary. The allies would be asked to contribute money.¹

But this proposal, it will be noticed, looked entirely away from the complications in the North and contained no reference to them. It was merely a plan of action for the following summer, and coolly avoided the pressing issue then at hand. The Swedes complained bitterly. Even the English felt guilty. Thurloe wrote apologetically to Jephson on December 18, "If the king be disposed to the same thing, you may take occasion to tell him that this is but an essay and is intended only as a foundation to begin upon, and if he please to declare himself for the general good you are authorized and charged to perfect it with him."² So loud were Friesendorff's protestations that the Protector promised in an evil hour to furnish the king with £30,000, with a prospect of more if he could raise it.³

The Swedes submitted with an ill grace. Yet what must have been their indignation when even this promise was not kept. "I have had many discourses with Mons. Frohendorf [Friesendorff], one of his ministers here," wrote Thurloe to Jephson, "whom I find a very ready man, but am somewhat doubtful how he represents things to his master. I fear the worst. I informed you by my former letter that H. H. had promised £30,000 by monthly payments; one month is past

¹ Pufendorff, iv., § 84. These proposals, so far as they are given by Pufendorff, are the same as those contained in the paper "Heads of a treaty, to be made with the king of Sweden, for a nearer union, etc.," printed in Thurloe Papers, vii., 23, under the date of March 25, 1658, and they would appear to be practically if not absolutely identical. This would suggest the possibility of error in the date of the printed paper, else the English were making the same proposals after the treaty of Roeskilde as before, which, however, is by no means impossible. But I cannot verify this point, as it is not known where the original paper is preserved. Mr. Gardiner tells me he thinks it is in private possession. I am not in a position to say whether the paper printed in Lünig's Staats-Concilia, ii., 613, "Bedenken König Carl Gustavs in Schweden über das Formular des ihm von England offerirten Bündnisses, de Anno 1658," complaining of the unreasonable trading privileges demanded by the English, refers to these proposals or to some others of which I have found no further account.

² English Historical Review, vii., 727.

³ Pufendorff, iv., § 84, with the marginal date November 9.

and none paid, which he speaks so freely of, and of the great disappointment his master's affairs are put under thereby, that truly his expressions are hardly borne."¹ He explains that the reason for the non-payment was that a part of the fleet had come in unexpectedly and large sums were necessary to pay the men, who would otherwise mutiny.² The Protector was in fact struggling to keep his head above water by means of small loans, and the payment of the promised subsidy was utterly impossible.

It was not likely that the Protector's efforts to come to an agreement on the basis of an unkept promise, and without first settling the Danish matter, would be of much avail. His efforts to negotiate through Jephson instead of with Fleetwood and Friesendorff had from the first met with little success. The king was waiting for the result of his proposals in London, Jephson thought. Now the matter of the promised subsidy presented a new hinderance. Both Jephson, and afterwards Meadowe, constantly urged its payment. "I do confess," wrote Jephson February 12, 1658, "I could wish the money had either never been promised, or paid at the time appointed. * * * I have much reason to believe that this is the only cause why they proceed not with me in the treaty."

Gothenburg and Fredericia ; the Partition of Denmark Again.—In

¹ English Historical Review, vii., 727. Friesendorff was the only one of the Swedish ambassadors who aroused the least ill-will in London. All the others appear to have been exceptionally popular, even though their northern vigor did occasionally get the better of their courtesy. This letter to Jephson contains the following ugly passage, which shows how much personal bitterness had entered into the negotiations: "This long story I have told you to prevent any misrepresentation formed by Monsr. Frohendorf, who I fear is — yet enough for these things, and I hear labours to disgrace my Ld. G. Fleetwood with the king, which I should much desire might be prevented by you. If you can perceive anything of the kind the[re], it will be a great disservice to the king's affairs if anything of the kind should be, for whatever Monsr. Frohendorf apprehends he is beholden to him for all the — ? he hath, and you know the interest the Lord Deputy hath in the state and if he should [? see his hoorn put out by other] I believe Monsr. Frohendorf would soon find himself disabled ever to do the least thing here in any of his affairs. The truth is, had it not been [for] my Lord G., who solicited council here, there never had been a man obtained hence out of the old — (?)." It would thus seem to be an error for Pufendorff to accredit these negotiations entirely to Friesendorff. It will be noticed that in documents and letters signed by Fleetwood and Friesendorff, the name of the former comes first, indicating, I take it, precedence in rank as ambassador. Fleetwood appears not only to have played the chief part in these negotiations, but also a very important part in the preceding ones. His family connections gave him great advantages over the other ambassadors, who besides must have found the language a serious drawback in a court which did not speak Latin. Jephson mentioned this accusation against Friesendorff to Charles Gustavus only to be assured that it had no foundation in fact. Thurloe Papers, vi., 728.

²This was not a feigned excuse. Sir Christopher Pack loaned the government £4,000 to pay the wages of the fleet. Dic. Nat. Biog. Also some others advanced money. Cal. S. P. Dom., May 11, 1658.

our sketch of the negotiations in London, we have been carried past a striking diplomatic incident of which, unfortunately, we have but the merest hint. Jephson had throughout shown much partiality towards Charles Gustavus. He was convinced that he sincerely desired peace, but doubted whether Denmark did. He thought nothing would so soon incline Denmark to it as "a strict and speedy conjunction between England and Sweden," and urged that a few frigates would be a cogent argument against Danish obstinacy.¹ These views were, of course, very favorable to Charles Gustavus, and we need not be surprised to find that Jephson received in return an accurate knowledge, at least in outline, of the king's plans with regard to Denmark.

On November 2 Jephson sent the Council "the relation of an action perhaps as extraordinary as may fall out in an age";² but the letter is unfortunately lost. In his next dispatch he refers to it as containing his "sense of the whole state of affairs in these parts, upon the taking of Fredericksode [Fredericia]," and continues: "I know nothing in my poor opinion were more worthy his Highness, than (at this time when he hath ministers with all the most considerable Protestant princes and states) to propose a general meeting for the advancement of the common interest of religion, and the civil interest, and reconciling of differences; for (until both religion and the civil interest of every state be something secured) I fear particular treaties will not do the work."³ At last in an important letter of the 24th of November, he gives some clue to the contents of his letter of November 2. After urging again "a general treaty betwixt all the Protestants," he proceeds, "Sir, my meaning by joining with Sweden was, that if by the king of Denmark's obstinacy the power of the Baltic Sea shall be devolved to other hands, you would so oblige the king of Sweden by assisting him, that he might put a part of it in your hand. The places I mentioned in my letter of the 2d instant, and my opinion of them, according to my best intelligence, which I suppose you had not then received, they were Gottenburg and Fredericksode. I assure myself you were not before ignorant of the conveniences and inconveniences belonging to them, which I will not presume to judge of."⁴ "I shall

¹ See Jephson's dispatches in Thurloe Papers.

² Thurloe Papers, vi., 597.

³ Ibid., 604. He was again urging Charles Gustavus' policy, it will be noticed.

⁴ Ibid., 629.

not sail punctually," he says in this same letter, "to observe his Highness' command to the king of Sweden concerning the business of Fredericksodde."

The thread of evidence offered by this passage is slight, yet taken in connection with accompanying circumstances, it seems clear, that in answer to the Protector's constant demand for "security" and a military base before undertaking a distant campaign, Charles Gustavus had suggested that Fredericia and Gothenburg might serve this purpose. The mention of Fredericia had, of course, reference to its recent capture and may possibly have been intended to whet Cromwell's appetite for the whole of Jutland. I find it difficult to believe, however, that the king was willing to surrender so important a port as Gothenburg, the only Swedish port without the Sound, in anything like permanent possession, especially after the efforts which had just been made to increase its importance.¹ It would seem more probable that it was proposed as temporary headquarters for the English fleet, for which it was admirably suited, and had little value to the Swedes at the time from the ease with which it could be blockaded by the Danes.

That proposals of this kind were made is not of itself improbable. Pufendorff gives an account² of still more remarkable proposals, which resemble those of Friesendorff's instructions. If Cromwell would undertake to support Sweden without reserve and strike Denmark to the ground, Charles Gustavus would agree to its partition in the following terms: Norway, Schonen, Seeland, and Fünen should be incorporated with Sweden, while Cromwell should have the whole of Jutland and Bremen; the passage of the Sound would be free to all nations, and the prospect was offered of an attack on Austria. Or, if Cromwell preferred, Sweden would take only Norway and Schonen, and allow Cromwell Bremen, while the crown of Denmark would be given to another. The plan of giving Jutland to the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, Cromwell taking Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, was also mentioned. But Cromwell's answer must be given soon and his acceptance unreserved, else so important a position as Bremen could not be surrendered. I have not found the slightest reference to these pro-

¹ Fries, Erik Oxenstierna, p. 132.

² Lib. iv., § 86, undated, but they must have come at about this time.

posals among English records, and so cannot tell what impression they made. They had, however, the very serious drawback of giving Sweden absolute control of the supplies for ship-building, which was considered a power too great to be intrusted to one hand. This was considered a matter of vital importance at the time and is often mentioned in the diplomatic correspondence relating to the North.

It would be to no purpose to trace further the details of the ensuing negotiations. They present nothing new. One meets the same difficulties, the same arguments, and delays for much the same reasons.¹ The only episode worth mentioning is Cromwell's speech to both Houses of Parliament on January 25,² which throws a flood of light on the Protector's feelings at this time. "I do believe, he that looks well about him, and considereth the estate of the Protestant affairs all Christendom over ; he must needs say and acknowledge that the grand design now on foot, in comparison with which all other designs are but low things, is, Whether the Christian world shall be all popery? * * * I have, thank God, considered, and I would beg of you to consider a little with me: What that resistance is that is likely to be made to this mighty current, which seems to be coming from all parts on all Protestants ? Who is there that holdeth up his head to oppose this danger? A poor prince ;—indeed poor ; but a man in his person as gallant, and truly I think I may say as good, as these last ages have brought forth ; a man that hath advanced his all against the popish interest in Poland and made his aquisition still good 'there' for the Protestant religion. He is now reduced into a corner ; and that which addeth to the grief of all,—more than all that hath been spoken of before (I wish it may not be truly said !)—is, That men of our religion forget this, and seek his ruin. * * * It is a design against our very being ; this artifice, and this complex design, against the Protestant interest,—wherein so many Protestants are not so right as were to be wished ! If they can shut us out of the Baltic Sea, and make themselves master of that, where is your trade? Where are your materials to preserve your shipping? Where will you be able to challenge any right by sea, or justify yourself against a foreign invasion in your own soil? Think upon it; this is in design!"

¹ Pufendorff's account is very full here. Lib., iv., § 86. Lib., v., §§ 73, 74, and 75. I have nothing of importance to add to it.

² Reported in Burton's Diary, ii., 351. Also Carlyle, Speech XVII.

Surely it was no fault of intention that the Protector did not take a more active part in this business ! But with the imminent dangers on every hand, a bankrupt treasury, the army and civil service unpaid, Ireland unsettled, Scotland in great suffering, England impatient, and the two Houses disputing about titles and refusing to come to business,¹ what could the Protector do ? His efforts to mediate had come to a standstill, yet he could not bring himself to adopt a different course. While he was hesitating and waiting for a favorable turn in the course of events, an unpropitious Providence paved the way for Swedish successes which rendered hopeless his plan of reconciling the two nations, even for the preservation of their faith.

Treaty of Roeskilde.—It is of course impossible to give here any account of the negotiations which preceded and followed the treaty of Roeskilde, or of the exceedingly complicated events attending Cromwell's attempt to mediate a new peace after the outbreak of the second war in August ; but it is of great interest to observe how Cromwell's attitude towards both nations was changed by these startling events, and how his general policy was affected by the altered state of politics in the North.

There are no special instructions to Meadowe concerning the treaty of Roeskilde, but, fortunately, both Thurloe and Meadowe have told us of the objects sought by the Protector with a candor and directness which leaves nothing to be desired. “The Protector,” says Thurloe,² “though he wished in general the prosperity of the Swede, his ally, hoping that at last his arms might be directed the right way, yet did not like that the Swede should conquer the Dane, and possess all those countries, and being thereby become powerful, engross the whole trade of the Baltic Sea, wherein England is so much concerned, and therefore he interposed in most serious terms with both the kings to make peace, which was accepted by both.” “The English mediator,” writes Meadowe, “had two parts to act in this scene ; one was to moderate the demands as far as he could in favor of the sufferer, without disobligeing the Swede by a too notorious partiality. The other was to watch lest anything be stipulated betwixt the two kings prejudicial to the interests of England. It was moved that the whole kingdom of Norway

¹ Inderwick, *Studies in the Great Rebellion*, 27.

² *Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time.*

should be rent off from Denmark and united to Sweden, with which it lay contiguous: This entrenched upon England as giving the Swede the sole and entire possession of the chief materials, as masts, deals, pitch, tar, copper, iron, etc., needful for the apparel and equipage of our ships, too great a treasure to be entrusted in one hand. The mediator, in avoidance of this was the first who insinuated the proposal of rending Sconen and Blecking to the Swede, which would cut off that unnecessary charge both crowns sustained in garrisoning a frontier each against other, by enlarging the Swedish dominions to the bank of the Sound, the ancient and natural boundary of Sweden. This though uneasy to the Dane because of the vicinity of those provinces to Copenhagen the metropolis, yet was safe for England, because by this means the Swede is become master of one bank of the Sound as the Dane is of the other, though the accustomed duty of passage (the best flower in the Danish garland) was reserved by the treaty wholly to the Dane. Thus the power over that narrow entry into the Baltic being balanced betwixt two emulous crowns, will be an effectual preventive of any new exactions or usurpation in the Sound.”¹

Thus the efforts of the English mediator were directed chiefly, almost exclusively, to the preservation of English commercial interests. This need occasion no surprise, since the Protector had no other rule to guide him in case of a conflict between these two Protestant powers. While, of course, the interests of religion required that Protestant nations should not turn their arms against each other, yet it was the interests of trade, not of religion, which was the Protector’s incentive for preserving the *status quo* in the Baltic,—always, as we have seen, a vital point of his policy. If he could not share in the partition of Denmark for fear of giving too much power to Sweden in the Baltic, much less could he allow Denmark to be entirely swallowed up by Sweden without a share in the booty. Yet he had no objection to Denmark’s being partially absorbed by Sweden in so far as English interests would be benefited by it. The English were, indeed, far from disin-

¹ Narrative, p. 58. See, also, View of the Suedish and Other Affairs, p. 169, *seq.* “For’tis evident that the dividing the banks of the Sound betwixt the two emulous crowns, as it was done by the Roschild treaty, is greater to the security and benefit of England, etc.” “I am making all the haste I can to the king of Swede, as conceiving his Highness not a little concerned in these affairs, especially in the interest of the Sound, and the traffic of the Baltic Sea.” Jephson to Henry Cromwell, February 22, 1658. Lansdowne MSS. 822, fol. 143.

terested mediators. "The Swedish propositions, I confess, are very high," wrote Meadowe,¹ "but their advantages are likewise very great."

Yet, in view of the circumstances, the conditions of the treaty, while severe, were favorable to Denmark, which was due in no small measure to the offices of the mediators, particularly, it would appear, of Meadowe. Frederick III. sent a letter to Cromwell thanking him for his good offices and commanding Meadowe, who also received the extraordinary honor of the Order of the Elephant, the highest order in Denmark, together with the offer of a pension, which he tells us he refused. There were many scandalous reports concerning Meadowe circulated at that time by the Swedes and others, which may or may not have been true,² but they have, at least, the significance of showing how bitter was the resentment felt against him.

After the Treaty of Roeskilde.—The relations between England and Sweden were not altered by the treaty of Roeskilde so much as one might have expected. The Swedes seemed not to cherish their resentment and the negotiations in London proceeded much as before.³ I shall not trouble the reader with an account of them, for I have nothing to add to what Pufendorff tells us.⁴ They illustrate how Cromwell's foreign efforts were hampered by internal difficulties, but have little further significance. The Swedes urged to the last the payment of the £30,000 which Cromwell had promised in the preceding November, but Parliament had been dissolved without obtaining a grant, and though Cromwell repeated his promise, he was never in a position to fulfil it. In short, Cromwell was laboring under such insuperable difficulties that no definite action could be reasonably expected of him. The various proposals which were made, none of which had anything novel about them, are therefore of little interest.

One notices distinctly, however, this difference in Cromwell's treatment of Sweden, that he is more ready to give way to the demands of

¹ Meadowe to Thurloe. *Thurloe Papers*, vi., 802.

² It is difficult to get at the truth of these stories, which are to be found at sufficient length in Pufendorff. We should not, I think, lend them too ready credence, since they rest on the authority of Meadowe's political enemies. Pufendorff tells us, for example, that certain Danish noblemen objected to one of Meadowe's station being made a member of the Order of the Elephant, and that Meadowe resigned the Order for a sum of money. But on May 31 (Meadowe to Thurloe, *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, vii., 732) he was still in possession of the Order. However, he seems at best to have escaped with some loss of dignity, and felt called upon to explain in various letters to Thurloe.

³ See note, page 63.

⁴ *Puf.*, v., §§ 76-83.

Charles Gustavus than before. He has lost his control of affairs in the North, which is nowhere shown more clearly than in this, that he is now prepared to yield to Sweden the possession of Prussia. Meadowe's instructions of April 9, 1658,¹ in view of the expected negotiations between Charles Gustavus and the other powers at Braunsberg for the purpose of the further pacification of the North, reads: “* * * as to his retaining of Prussia, you are very well to understand the mind of the king of Sweden therein, and in case you find him fixed thereupon, you shall then endeavour in the treaty, yet with that circumspection and prudence that becomes a mediator, that Prussia may be quitted to him by the king of Poland and to that purpose endeavour by all befitting wariness to incline the ministers of the States General thereunto, who are most likely to oppose it upon the interest of trade, to satisfy whom you may procure such assurance from the king of Sweden in that of trade in reference to his and that state as may remove that difficulty. * * * And as the matter of commerce, you are not to be wanting there to inform yourself therein and to provide for the same, and the interest of this state therein, so far as you shall have opportunity.”

One might infer from this and other references that interests of trade were dominant in the Protector's mind, and that the matter of the great Protestant alliance had been driven entirely into the background. This is certainly true to a certain extent and lay in the general state of northern politics. “That war, whilst it lasted, discomposed affairs so much, as they could never be composed again,” said Thurloe.² Yet a truer statement of the case would be this, that the real motive of Cromwell's policy was still antagonism to the house of Austria, but there had arisen a new and more important issue in the trade of the Baltic. Instead of the Piedmont massacres and mere vague alarms, they had now a definite and tangible bone of contention. “It being the design of the Imperial House to get these countries and to —? you the Baltic Sea under pretence of giving aid to the king of Denmark.”³ “The Protector very much apprehended

¹S. P., Sweden, ix. They are dated April 9, 1656, but though this is an original dating, the context shows it to be an error. It should be 1658. Among other things the treaty of Roeskilde is referred to. They are printed in Thurloe Papers, vii., 63, where the correct date is given.

²Burton's Diary, iii., 378.

³Thurloe to Meadowe, November 27, 1657. Eng. Hist. Rev., vii., 724.

the issue of this conjunction; he thought it equally dangerous for England that the Swede should be ruined and the Dane preserved by such saviours, who after they had broken the king of Sweden would also make a prey of the Dane himself, the emperor in his assistance he gave against the Swede, revived the old design of the Austrian [eagle] stretching her wings towards the eastern sea, and planting herself upon the Baltic.”¹

When the war between Sweden and Denmark was begun again in August by Charles Gustavus, as usual without consulting the Protector,² the latter renewed his efforts to restore the peace. That his policy had not undergone any material change by the treaty of Roeskilde is shown by the similarity between these two attempts at mediation. “The Protector in this whole business laid this for a foundation, that it was not for the interest of this nation that either the Swede or Dane should be ruined in this war, and that it was ever safest for England that the Sound and those countries should remain in the hands of the Dane, and therefore as he had interposed in the first war to preserve the Dane, so he resolved by the same measures to proceed and so to manage these affairs that this might receive no alteration in those parts.”³ This had been the starting point of the first mediation. Again, as before, the mediation was offered between Sweden and Denmark alone, and without including other powers, which would complicate and delay matters. “That which the Protector pitched upon in this great occasion was to endeavour a present peace between the Dane and the Swede, upon the late treaty of Roskild, made by his own mediation without taking in the differences between Poland and Sweden, or the Swede and Brandenburg, or comprehending the pretences of the Dutch and the Emperour, which having many intricacies in them would require time. This the Protector did to obviate the designs of the Dutch, as also to keep open the door for making use of the arms of the Swede another way. This was liked by none of the contending parties, the Swede though thus beset, yet having got into his possession the Sound and all Denmark but the town of Copenhagen, and believing that France and England would not suffer him to flinch was unwilling to be brought back again to the treaty of

¹ Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell’s Time. Also Cromwell’s speech quoted on page 67.

² The Protector never learned the exact causes of this war.

³ Thurloe, Foreign Affairs in Cromwell’s Time.

Roskild. The Dane was more adverse than he, not doubting but by the aid of his confederates to recover all again, and the confederates opposed it or any treaty without comprehending all their interests, and the Dutch most of all infested here, the meaning whereof was that they had all agreed totally to ruin the Swede, and the Dutch doubted not of his part in the advantage."¹

These last efforts to restore the peace in the North could not, from the difficulties with which Cromwell was surrounded and his own failing health, be other than lame and without result. They are interesting, not from their results, but as showing what Cromwell tried to do.

The New Protector; Cronenburg.—It would hardly be justifiable to close this narrative without some notice of the affairs after Cromwell's death, since Thurloe remained secretary of state, and in only one regard did the administration of the foreign office suffer a material change. Richard announced that his father's policy in the North would be continued ;² yet in one point, unconsciously, perhaps, he departed from it. The outbreak of the war between Sweden and Denmark had so confused northern affairs that the Protector's plan for a great Protestant alliance had been driven entirely into the background. It had become, in fact, impracticable, and no longer coincided with the actual trend of European politics. Yet he clung to it with the greatest persistence, and as long as he lived the religious controversy was still a factor in European politics which could not be ignored. After his death, however, it ceases to become so. The habit of referring to the "Protestant interest" continued for a time in England, as might be expected, yet not only do these phrases occur less frequently, but one feels instinctively that they were less sincere. The proof that they were so lies in the fact that the controlling motive in English foreign politics was no longer hostility to the Catholic house of Hapsburg, but the commercial rivalry of their Protestant kinsmen, the Dutch. It is hardly an

¹ Thurloe, *Foreign Affairs* in Cromwell's time. The relations with the Netherlands are a kind of barometer which indicate the ebbs and flows of motives of trade in English foreign politics. In the increased hostility here shown, we have an indication that commercial interests were of increasing importance, and, as we know, became, after the Protector's death, the sole spring of English action in the North. We must bear in mind, in using Thurloe's account, that it was written in 1660, when the dominant feature of English foreign policy was the rivalry of the Dutch. His whole account is colored by it. This was by no means so important a feature of the Protector's policy as one would gather from his paper, and I have not always felt justified in accepting his statements. But with this qualification, it is of course a source of the highest value.

² Pufendorff, v., § 115.

exaggeration to say that the death of Cromwell marks an epoch in European history, the close of the period of religious wars.

When Charles Gustavus landed in Seeland he sent a special envoy, John Leyenbergen, to England with an explanation of the causes of the war, and a request for at least twenty ships, in return for which he was ready to grant, in addition to certain staple rights, that English ships enjoy equal privileges in Sweden with Swedish unarmed ships, and that certain quantities of shipping materials be furnished England at a lower price.¹ But Cromwell died before receiving this message. I have found two references to another concession not mentioned by Pufendorff which Charles Gustavus is said to have proposed, presumably in this connection. On February 23, 1659, Mr. Topham, a burgess for York, informed Parliament that he had been told by a merchant who had carried dispatches between the English government and Charles Gustavus, that Charles Gustavus had made offer of Elsinore Castle as security for the loan of twenty English frigates.² The subject is mentioned again in a tract by Slingsby Bethel, entitled "The World's Mistake in Oliver Cromwell," which was printed anonymously in 1668.³ Bethel tells us, referring to it as a sufficiently well known matter, that Cromwell and Charles Gustavus had agreed to divide the control of the Baltic between them, and that Cromwell's share was to be Elsinore Castle and Cronenburg, "the Gibraltar of the North," together with the tolls of the Sound. Bethel shows himself throughout this tract so well informed⁴ that I was at first inclined to accept his statement, but after discovering the passage in Burton it seems to me not improbable that this is the source of Bethel's information. If this is true, and Bethel is merely repeating a general rumor which originated with

¹ Pufendorff, v., 114.

² "Two mas'ers of Hull were at the Baltic, in October last, being laden with corn. One of them carried a packet from the king of Sweden, and brought one back again. He affirmed that the king offered, if his Highness of England wold but lend him twenty frigates, he wold deposit in our hands Elsinore Castle for his security, and I believe we might have our own terms. Nothing under Heaven concerns the English so much as that channel. Let us plant our ships in time there, and we may have advantage enough of the Hollander." Burton's Diary, iii., 496.

³ It is printed in Harleian Miscellany, i., 287, and in State Tracts, part i., 376. I have printed the passage under consideration as Appendix (B) to this work.

⁴ Compare, for example, his statements with regard to Ostend, Newport, and Dunkirk with those of Thurloe in Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time. I have found the statement of Cromwell's willingness finally to yield Prussia to Charles Gustavus only in the original instructions, in Pufendorff and in this tract. Bethel stood in well with the Republicans and was in a position to receive much information. I have been able to verify several statements which I found first in this pamphlet.

Topham's statement to Parliament, which in turn rested upon the statement of a merchant carrying secret dispatches and not, so far as we can see, in a position to know their contents, then the whole story rests upon a very slender footing. These suspicions must be strengthened by the fact that when Meadowe, in the spring of 1659, hinted at the English possession of Cronenburg and the island Hewen, Charles Gustavus seems not to have entertained the proposal for a moment.¹ If he himself had made the same proposal a few months before, one is at a loss to account for so sudden a change in his attitude, since there appears to be no diplomatic or military event which would explain it. Yet Charles Gustavus did sometimes change his plans for no very great reason, and he may have done so in this case. It is impossible to decide the matter definitely without fuller information. In the meantime, those interested in the subject may be glad to have their attention called to these passages.

The Partition of Denmark Again.—The ill success of Charles Gustavus' second invasion of Denmark and the desperate state of his fortunes in consequence of it, made him more willing than he had ever been before to concede real advantages to England if English support could be obtained by it. Even before Cromwell's death, Pufendorff tells us of a proposal that Cromwell occupy Emden or Meppen in order to hold the Dutch in check and prevent the Austrians from raising recruits in Westphalia. As soon as Charles Gustavus heard of Cromwell's death, he sent another ambassador, Gustavus Duval, to Richard with a request for aid against the Dutch similar to the one sent through Leyenbergen, but though Richard declared his readiness to enter into an offensive alliance with Sweden against Austria and a defensive alliance against the rest of the world, yet he gave various excuses for not furnishing the twenty ships asked for. In October Friesendorff received secret orders to offer Bremen and Verden to Richard if he would assist in the Swedish conquest of Denmark and Norway, but with the proviso that the provinces should not be delivered into English possession until after the surrender of Copenhagen. Both ambassadors were authorized to offer freedom from tolls in the Sound

¹ Pufendorff, vi., § 21. Downing wrote Thurloe from the Hague that the Dutch were trying to secure the same prize from the Danes. Downing to Thurloe, Thurloe Papers, vii., 427, 469, 506, and 515. Thurloe evidently believed this. “* * * and as now, in fact, they [the Dutch] had in mortgage a part of the king of Denmark's dominions, they were also to have Cronenburg Castle into their hands as security for the money expended in the war.” Foreign Affairs in Cromwell's Time.

and in Iceland in return for money and ships.¹ These offers were not without attraction for the English court. In case their policy of mediation proved fruitless, they were willing to assist the king, but only defensively, and on condition of some advantage for their costs. Meadowe mentioned Stade and Landskrona as suitable for this purpose,² and during the summer Richard had proposed an alliance on the basis of freedom from tolls in the Sound for English commerce, equal rights with Swedes in all Swedish ports and the closing of the Sound to England's enemies.³ To this Charles Gustavus made a counter-proposal, that England take possession of Glückstadt, Krempen, and Wilsteren, and as security for loans, Iceland, with the jurisdiction over Berghen, the claims of Norway to the Orkney Islands, and in addition Stade and Swingen, except the sovereignty over this city. Meadowe suggested that Cronenburg and the island Hewen would be more acceptable, which embarrassed the king greatly, since the cession of these places could not be thought of. He was driven, therefore, to recur to his old plan of dividing Denmark. Friesendorff was empowered to offer Bremen and Verden and the assistance of Sweden in obtaining Iceland and Greenland, provided Richard would aid in the conquest of Norway. If Richard were willing to go further and partition Denmark, England would receive in addition to the above all of Jutland except the dominions of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, together with freedom from tolls in the Sound. Norway, Seeland, Fünen and the other islands would go to Sweden. But the abdication of Richard put an end to these schemes.⁴

It would be an injustice to Richard, however, to emphasize these adventurous plans unduly. They occupied at best but a secondary place

¹ Pufendorff, v., § 115.

² Ibid., § 118. "Therefore in case of an obstinate repugnancy to the peace on the Danish part upon the terms aforesaid, to assist the Swede in a defensive way under certain cautions and restrictions. In which the case of assistance, for in war many things may be supposed and provided against which never come to pass, the Swede was to give real gages and pledges for the garantie of his faith. To which end the English mediator had often and closely remonstrated to him that 'twas not reasonable to put a sword into another's hand without a previous assurance of its not being made use of against one's self. And used it also as an argument to dispose the otherwise unwilling Swede to a peace with the Dane (for a war with Denmark was of all wars the most commodious for him) because he was not to expect an assistance from England which should cost him nothing. And to forecast the temper of affairs, proceeded so far as to nominate Stade upon the Elbe, and Landskron in the Sound, to be put in case of such assistance into English hands; which taking vent afterwards, gave occasion to that frivolous report how that England and Sweden had agreed together to share Denmark betwixt them." Meadowe's Narrative, p. 119.

³ Pufendorff, vi., § 20, with the marginal date May 7. Carlson, iv., 334.

⁴ Ibid., § 21. Carlson, iv., 334. Soon after Charles Gustavus tried the effect of similar pro-

in his thoughts, and were only an alternative in case his plan of mediating a peace should fail. It was to give emphasis to this attempt at mediation that a fleet had been sent to the Sound in the autumn of 1659 under Goodson, but it was forced to return without accomplishing anything, owing to the lateness of the season. In the following spring another fleet was sent out under Admiral Montague, who appeared before Copenhagen in April, not for the purpose, as both the Swedes and Danes at first supposed, of unconditionally supporting the Swedish cause, but to force them to accept peace on the basis of the treaty of Roeskilde, and to lend aid to Charles Gustavus only in so far as it might appear necessary from the attempts of the Dutch or of the confederates of the Danes to defeat this object. When one considers the great difficulties under which Richard labored and his constant struggles with Parliament, his effective interference in the Baltic really does him great credit. A war with Holland over the matter was at first by no means impossible, and the presence of the English fleet in the Baltic not only prevented a more active interference by the Dutch in behalf of the Danes, but persuaded them that independent action in the Baltic was impracticable. The first Concert of the Hague was therefore by no means a concession to the Dutch, but was quite in accordance with the English policy of armed mediation, and was moreover, although the Swedish king bitterly resented this attempted dictation, in reality an act of friendship towards Sweden. The second and third Concerts of the Hague, however, concluded by the Parliament after Richard's abdication, show clearly how England's foreign influence was paralyzed by internal difficulties. It would take us too far from our subject to discuss the negotiations leading up to the treaty of Oliva, which form, moreover, a chapter in Dutch rather than in English history, since the Parliament had lost its influence over the course of affairs, and was compelled to resign the conduct of the mediation into the hands of its rivals. "The truth is they made no great scruple, at least for that one time, to come under the stern of their neighbouring Commonwealth, thereby to have better leisure to recollect and refit the scattered planks and pieces of their own broken Republic."¹

posals in Holland. Erdmannsdörffer, Deutsche Geschichte, i., 337. Carlson, iv., 342. Charles Gustavus' plan was to unite Norway with Sweden, together with Cronenburg, in order to control the Sound.

¹ Meadowe's Narrative, p. 122.

APPENDIX.

A.

EXTRACT FROM FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN CROMWELL'S TIME, AS GIVEN BY THURLOE, 1660.

(Stowe MSS., clxxxv., fol. 187.)

The State of the Northern Affairs.—In the year [1655] the war broke out between Sweden and Poland, which Sweden undertook without any counsel of the Protector but after he was engaged therein he sent an extraordinary ambassador to desire aid from the Protector for carrying on that war as directed by him for the advantage of the Protestant interest.

In the debate of that affair it came to a proposition and an agreement, that the Swede should carry his arms against the emperor and house of Austria, and that upon the foundation thereof, and the war which England and France had with Spain (the other branch of the house of Austria in the west) a league offensive and defensive should be made between England, France, and Sweden, whereunto should be invited the states of Holland, king of Denmark, and the elector of Brandenburg and other states and a concept of articles was drawn and debated between the commissioners of the Protector and the ambassador of Sweden, and communicated to the Dutch and French ambassadors.

The Dutch declared their unwillingness, and apprehended danger to themselves from the success of the Swede in Poland, and took resolutions underhand to give him troubles, and by great promises of assistance to the king of Denmark, and by rewards to his councilors, engaged that king contrary to his own interests, to invade the king of Sweden in his Duchy of Bremen.

This drew the king of Sweden out of Poland and set the war wholly on a new foot, and most of the princes of states in Europe found themselves concerned to intermeddle in it.

The principal combatants were the king of Sweden, Poland, and Denmark, the duke of Brandenburg who at first joined with Sweden, fell off to Poland, the emperor also declared with him.

The Dutch underhand irritate the aforesaid princes against the Swede, though openly they were in treaty with him for adjusting their own interests.

The Swede had nevertheless that success against the Dane, that they had almost made a conquest of all Denmark and was bringing the Sound under his power.

The Protector though he wished in general the prosperity of the Swede, his ally, hoping that at last his arms might be directed the right way, yet did not like that the Swede should conquer the Dane, and possess all those countries, and being thereby become powerful, engross the whole trade of the Baltic Sea, wherein England is so much concerned, and therefore he interposed in most serious terms with both the kings to make peace which was accepted by both, and peace ensued, thereupon, called the peace or treaty of Roskild. But the war being renewed again the next autumn the matter became more entangled. The emperor, duke of Brandenburg, kings of Poland and Denmark entered into a league of offensive and defensive [] against the Swede, the Dutch also declare the same way, and prepare a fleet and land forces for the assistance of the Dane.

The Protector very much apprehended the issue of this conjunction, he thought it equally dangerous for England that the Swede should be ruined and the Dane preserved by such saviours, who after they had broken the king of Sweden, would also make a prey of the Dane himself, the emperor in his assistance he gave against the Swede, revived the old design of the Austrian [eagle] stretching her wings towards the eastern sea, and planting herself upon the Baltic.

The Dutch aimed at the command of the Sound and under pretence that the Dane was too weak to keep it against his neighbours, would have kept it for him, and had already swallowed up [Drunth-heim] a place of great importance, mortgaged to them by the king of Denmark for money to support him in his wars, and was agreed to be delivered into his hands, so that the price of the king of Denmark's deliverance, was like to be the resigning himself up into the hands of the Dutch as his guardians.

That which the Protector pitched upon in this great occasion was to endeavour a present peace between the Dane and the Swede, upon the late treaty of Roskild, made by his own mediation without taking in the differences between Poland and Sweden, or the Swede and Brandenburg, or comprehending the pretences of the Dutch and the emperour, which having many intricacies in them would require time.

This the Protector did to obviate the designs of the Dutch, as also to keep open the door for making use of the arms of the Swede in another way.

This was liked by none of the contending parties, the Swede though thus beset, yet having got into his possession the Sound and all Denmark but the town of Copenhagen, and believing that France and England would not suffer him to flinch was unwilling to be brought back again to the treaty of Roskild. The Dane was more adverse than he, not doubting but by the aid of his confederates to recover all again and the confederates opposed it, or any treaty without comprehending all their interests, and the Dutch most of all infested here, the meaning whereof was, that they had all agreed totally to ruin the Swede, and the Dutch doubted not of his part in the advantage.

The Protector in this whole business laid this for a foundation, that it was not for the interest of this nation that either the Swede or Dane should be ruined in this war, and that [it] was ever safest for England, that the Sound and those countries should remain in the hands of the Dane, and therefore as he had interposed in the first war to preserve the Dane, so he resolved by the same measures to proceed, and so to manage these affairs that this might receive no alteration in those parts.

And having communicated with France herein and finding that Court to have the same sentiments, they entered into a treaty for the mutual management thereof, wherein it was agreed that France and England should propound to the two kings of Sweden and Denmark the renewing the treaty of Roskild without comprehending any of the confederates.

2dly. That they should declare themselves enemies to him that refuse it, and assist him that accept it.

3dly. That both should send to the Dutch to induce them to join in this mediation.

4thly. If a war should happen to England by reason of any assistance to be given in this case that France should declare the enemies of England enemies of France, and make war against them, and *é contra* England to do the same for France.

5thly. That the peace being made between the Dane and Swede, France and England shall interpose to reconcile the Swede to the king of Poland and duke of Brandenburg.

The ambassadors of France and England at the Hague propounded the terms aforesaid to the Dutch, but they refused, and instead thereof, prepared a general fleet and land forces to assist the Dane.

England finding words would not prevail, prepared also a good fleet, and sent word to the Dutch that his fleet was prepared for the Sound, whither it should sail the first opportunity, that upon the arrival of it there, France and England would offer the mediation to Sweden and Denmark to agree with them on the treaty of Roskild, and endeavour to compel the opposing party by force, at the same time the French and English at the Hague in the [name] of both their masters demanded of the states their declaration that no aid or assistance should be sent to the contending parties to enflame that war, and that they should call back such as they have already sent.

This being done in vigorous terms brought the Dutch to a temper and persuaded them to agree to join in the mediation on the aforesaid terms, and a treaty was therenpon entered into between all the three states for managing this affair and the fleets of both states to sail thither as common friends to both kings, to bring them to a peace in the manner before expressed.

At the same time a treaty was made between England and Sweden, that in case the king of Denmark was refractory and refused the peace, that then England would assist Sweden against them, and in recompence of the charges and hazards of the war, a sum of money was to be paid England and freedom to the English forever from paying toll in their passages to and from the Baltic Sea in case of success against the Dane, for the performance whereof security was to be given to England.

In pursuance of this treaty the English fleet sailed to the Sound and soon after arrived the Dutch, and then the mediation was offered to both the kings in the name of the three states, and a certain day pre-

fixed whether they would accept the peace upon the terms propounded, both made great difficulty therein, and the Dutch who openly joined with the French and English ambassadors did yet underhand dissuade the Dane from accepting, and spun out the treaty into a length, until the English fleet returned home from the necessity of their own affairs, leaving the treaty unfinished, the management whereof fell into the hands of the Rump, then entered of others who took different measures of this affair.

The Dutch had discovered in this and other affairs a fixed design to monopolize all trade into their own hands, that in the Mediterranean they hoped to obtain by occasion of that war between England and Spain, and having the carriage of all Spanish goods, and to manage their trade to and from the Indies in their ships, they endeavoured to put such articles upon England under the notion of a free ship free goods in the marine treaty, as might free their ships from all search and molestation, whereby enemy's goods might have been carried with all safety, desiring thereby to draw all traffic into their own ships, and so infinitely increase their own shipping and navigation.

By occasion of the wars in the eastern parts they endeavoured to engross the trade of the Baltic Sea, for having engaged the Dane to make war with the Swede, under pretence of giving him assistance, they designed to draw him into an absolute dependence upon them, and by means hereof to have the same power upon the Sound as in their own hands, a thing formerly attempted by them by taking the farm of that passage raising themselves and raising other nations at their pleasure, and as now in fact they had in mortgage a part of the king of Denmark's dominions, they were also to have Cronenburg Castle into their hands as a security for the money expended in the war.

As to the trade in the East Indies where they were superior at sea, they had in their [own] intentions swallowed all ; their method in those parts was this, if the English or any other nation had driven a good trade with any of those people, their manner was presently to proclaim war with that people, and lay a ship or two at sea before the ports where the trade was, which they called a blocking up, and by colour thereof seized on all ships and goods going in or out of those parts, as trading in an enemy's country, and on this pretence seized on three English [ships] in the East Indies, richly laden, and converted

them to their own use, the news hereof came about the same time when these negotiations were in the Sound, and satisfaction being asked of them, they at first justified the fact, but being told in plain terms that if the true value of the goods and ships according as they had been worth in case they had arrived safe, in Europe, were not paid at the day prefixed, that England would take their own satisfaction by force, they complied and paid to the merchants concerned the full value in ready money.

There were no greater considerations in England in reference to foreign interests, than how to obviate the growing greatness of the Dutch. This state of affairs in the Sound though raised by themselves seemed to give an occasion of doing something in it. The Swede was incensed against them as the authors of ruining his designs in Poland and elsewhere, and would have proclaimed war against them, if England would have engaged with him therein. The king of Denmark grew weary of his assistance, and expressed great discontent towards them, seeing that in the end though he should be preserved from the Swede, he should be left in the power of the Dutch, and swallowed up with their pretenses.

England was at that time in amity with both those kings, that of Sweden was not assured, but nothing of offence had happened with Denmark since the conclusion of the treaty 1654. But on the contrary, that king took acceptably the mediation of England, on which the peace of Roskild ensued, and sent letters of thanks for the good offices towards that crown.

That which seems to be England's true interest in this occasion, was to employ their utmost efforts to accommodate the differences between these two crowns, the means whereof after the Dutch did manifestly cross that in private which they had agreed to by treaty were these.

That England and France should use their joint endeavours to bring the Swede to abate of his demands to the Dane, which he could not prosecute without offence to all his neighbours, and instead thereof to prosecute his first designs against the house of Austria, following therein the example of great Gustavus, and wherein France and England would give him great assistance both of money and forces.

The Dane being thus delivered from this dangerous war []

be induced to a conjunction with Sweden and to favour his designs the others, England and France becoming the sponsors of the peace and amity between them.

To let the king of Denmark see the ill effects of his friendship with the Dutch, who had many times engaged him to the hazard of his crown, merely to serve their interests, thus they engaged him against England in 1622 and now against Sweden, and when he was thus engaged, they imposed on him unreasonable terms of assistance, at other times would assist against him as in 1654 when they helped the Swede against him, and obliged the Danes to yield up part of his dominions to the Swede, which he holds at this day.

And thereupon to offer him the friendship of England instead of the Dutch, as that which he might depend upon in any rencontres with his neighbours contrary to the peace to be agreed upon by any one side or the other, and thereby be freed from his dependence on the Dutch, who under pretence of friendship would oppress him.

The elector of Brandenburg was to be invited into this league, and to draw him off from those alliances which were contrary thereunto.

There was a particular treaty on foot with Sweden and Poland, that a good correspondence might be held with that kingdom, being the ancient ally with France and useful to England in respect of our trade to Danzig and the towns in the Regall-Prussia.

England, France, Sweden, Denmark, and Brandenburg being thus allied together upon their common interests, this was thought the best way that these affairs could be put into a reference to the interest of England in those, and the king of England being at that time upon solid terms of friendship with France, and having the advantage of ports on both sides the narrow seas, whence they could easily disturb their navigation through the channel, there was no doubt but the state of things would bring the Dutch either by fair means or force to live by their neighbours upon just and reasonable terms.

B.

EXTRACT FROM THE WORLD'S MISTAKE IN OLIVER CROMWELL.

(Harleian Miscellany, i., 287. State Tracts, part i., 376.)

But this man, who, through ignorance, is so strangely cried up in the world, was not guilty of this error in state only, but committed as great a solecism, in his designing the outing of the king of Denmark, and setting up the king of Sweden. For had the Swedes but got Copenhagen (as in all probability, had Oliver lived, they would have done,) they had wanted nothing of consequence, but the cities of Lubeck and Danzig (which, by their then potency, they would easily have gained), of being masters of the whole Baltic Sea, on both sides, from the Sound or mouth down to the bottom of it; by which, together with all Denmark, Norway, and the Danes' part of Holstein, which would consequently have been theirs (they then having, as they still have, the land of Bremen), there would have been nothing, but the small countries of Oldenberg and East Friesland, which would easily have fallen into their mouths, betwixt them and the United Netherlands, whereby Sweden would on the one side, to the north and north-east, have been as great, as France on the other, to the south and south-west; and they two, able to have divided the western empire betwixt them.

And whereas it had in all ages been the policy of the northern states and potentates, to keep the dominion of the Baltic Sea divided among several petty princes and states, that no one might be sole master of it; because, otherwise, most of the necessary commodities for shipping, coming from thence and Norway, any one lord of the whole might lay up the shipping of Europe, by the walls, in shutting only of his ports, and denying the commodities of his country to other states: Cromwell contrary to this wise maxim, endeavoured to put the whole Baltic Sea into the Swedes' hands, and undoubtedly had (though, I suppose, ignorantly) done it, if his death had not given them that succeeded him, the Long Parliament, an opportunity of prudently preventing it. For, if he had understood the importance of the Baltic Sea to this nation, he could not have been so impolitic, as to have projected so dangerous a design against his new Utopia, as giving the opening and shutting of it to any one prince. I am not ignorant, that

this error is excused, by pretending that we were to have had Elsinore and Cronenburg Castle, (the first, the town, upon the narrow entrance of the Baltic, called the Sound, where all ships ride, and pay toll to the king of Denmark; and the latter, the fortress, that defends both the town and ships,) by which we should have been masters of the Sound, and consequently of the Baltic: but they that know those countries, and how great a prince the Swede would have been, had he obtained all the rest, besides those two baubles; must confess, we should have been at his devotion, in our holding of any thing in his countries. And further, if the dangerous consequence of setting up so great a prince had not been in the case, it had been against the interest of England, to have had an obligation upon us to maintain places so remote, against the enmity of many states and princes; and that for these reasons:

First, because the ordinary tolls of the Sound would not have defrayed half the charge; and, to have taken more than the ordinary tolls, we could not have done, without drawing a general quarrel upon us, from most of the princes and states of the northern parts of Europe.

Secondly, etc.

C.

EXTRACT FROM THURLOE'S SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT,
FEBRUARY 18, 1859.(Burton's Diary, iii., 380, *seq.*)

This was the state of things in October last. His Highness, that now is, took these considerations:

1. The continuance of a war in these parts would infinitely hinder our trade, and be of very great prejudice to this nation; many of our manufacturers being transported and vented thither, and many of our materials for shipping and navigation being carried from thence, hither.

2. Considering what the issue of this war might be, that the Sound was likely to be put into the hands of those that would exclude the English, or put us in such a condition, as we should be as bad as excluded; the consequence of which would be the ruin of our shipping; hemp, pitch, tar, cordage and mast, coming all from thence, and an obstruction there, would endanger our safety.

We had experience of this in our war with the Dutch, when the Dane did prohibit our access thither, which put us to great distress, having none of those commodities, but what came from our enemies at double rates.

3. His Highness considered that the emperor was likely to arrive at the design of the house of Austria, to command the Baltic, and the eastern seas, as the Spaniard already hath the command of the western seas. Thus, they would command all the trade of the world. Of this the Dutch were so sensible before, as they engaged the Swede to come to hinder the progress of the emperor, who is now fairer in hopes of it than ever he was in the world, they having greater possessions there than formerly, as two or three principal places in Holstein, by the delivery of Denmark, are already garrisoned by the emperor's forces.

And I think the king of Denmark is in more danger from those that are allied with him than from his open enemies.

4. He considered that when the emperor had done his business there, he and his confederates would next pour themselves into Flanders, and

from thence hither into this Commonwealth, where they intend to bring in another government, when they are ready for it. Such counsels, we know, are on foot, *de facto*, already.

5. The great danger of overthrowing the Protestant interest, in general, which we have so much reason to preserve and promote.

His Highness, considering these mischiefs, thought himself concerned to obviate them as far as he could. We are yet in friendship with all these princes, and have no enmity with the emperor; nor would his Highness have it otherwise. He therefore thought fit to interpose upon the account of amity.

You should make it your first step to endeavour to reconcile those two fighting kings, thinking it to be our interest rather to preserve both, than to suffer either to be destroyed; and that France and you would join to take off the Dutch and Braudenburg, if possible to reconcile the Pole and Sweden.

To promote the success of this mediation, and bring all parties to a reconciliation, not excluding the house of Austria, too, his Highness thought fit and meet to send a fleet into those parts of twenty ships, to the intent to make a peace between the two kings, and of this he acquainted the States General.

